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SOCIAL FUTURES ALBERTA 1970 2005

HAROLD J. DYCK

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FOREWORD

Since early 1969, the Human Resources Research Council has sponsored a series of studies of the future. Two concerns have provided the impetus for these ventures:

1. A desire to inform the planning process in all areas of human resources development and to assist planners in advancing from a reactive to an anticipatory mode of plan development;
2. A desire to inform citizens of emerging trends in society and of the options open to them, so that they may be better able to shape their society and to avoid what has been called "future shock."

The study reported in this volume was sponsored jointly by the Human Resources Research Council and the Commission on Educational Planning. It is our hope that the study will assist that Commission, and others, to catch glimpses of alternative social futures, to perceive their implications for social and educational policy, and to create the types of planning mechanisms that will be required to guide our educational systems into the future.

The study was conducted for us by the Westrede Institute under the direction of Dr. Harold Dyck. To him, to his staff, and to his panelists, I express thanks for these anticipations of what may be in store for us in the future.

L. W. Downey, Director
The Human Resources Research Council of Alberta

PREFACE

This report summarizes the results of six forecasting exercises. The topics covered in these exercises are as follows: future changes in values and social goal orientations, future of the family, leisure and recreation in the future, intercultural relations in the future, the future of politics, and future needs and problems of the individual. These topics were selected for their relevance to the future of education, though their implications extend far beyond education.

The studies reported here were conducted on request from the Alberta Human Resources Research Council and the Commission on Educational Planning. This request was based on two important considerations. First is the task of shaping and managing education. This task requires the forecasting function as an essential planning and policy-making tool. Educational planning – the determination of goals, policies, priorities, and programs – is in many respects meaningless unless it is predicated on some appreciation of likely development on short-, intermediate-, and long-term horizons. Second is the utilization of the acquired information to affect changes within the current educational system, and the social system at large. Educational planning itself may be irrelevant unless it anticipates not only developments in the field of education directly, but also future developments in the social and economic context in which education and educational institutions must necessarily have their being.

This report is being released with the belief that the strengths of these forecasting exercises outweigh their obvious weaknesses and omissions. At the very least, the results reported here are the opinions of responsible, distinguished, insightful and thoughtful individuals. It is hoped that the list of forecasts presented here will be sufficiently worthwhile to interest policy-makers and planners in both the public and private sectors to assess implications of potential developments for a variety of policies and institutions, and to reinforce the importance of acting now on behalf of certain problems and conditions which are probable or feasible in the future.

A large number of individuals participated in these studies. Our panels of experts worked diligently and provided thoughtful insights far beyond those reported here. All panelists participated in these several projects without remuneration. The three agencies involved in the conduct and sponsorship of this project — Westrede Institute, the Alberta Human Resources Research Council and the Commission on Educational Planning — express their deep appreciation to the panelists for this participation.

I would further like to thank my several research assistants for their contributions — George Emery, Harold Gruber, Bud Purkis, Brian Stecyk, Stan Cowley, Suzie Poppe, Mike Luther, Linda Church and Tom Radford. These research assistants helped in contacting panelists, collating the data, and analyzing the large volumes of information which were returned by the panelists. I would also like to thank Ted Van Dyke for his periodic assistance in handling certain administrative aspects of the project. Lastly, I wish to thank the two secretaries who assisted in every phase of the project. My thanks to Marilyn Williams and Carole O'Donnell.

One disclaimer is in order. The forecasts which appear hear are the summation of forecasts provided by the panels of experts and not by the staff of the Westrede Institute. It is not our function to endorse the findings, but rather to present them for what they are. The forecasts which are contained in this report do not represent the views of the project staff.

I accept full responsibility, of course, for the way in which this project was conducted (given its terms of reference), for the analysis and interpretation of the data provided by the panelists, and for the manner in which the results of the study are reported here.

Harold J. Dyck
Director
Westrede Institute

INTRODUCTION

In 2005 Alberta will celebrate its centennial year. Will that centennial take place? If it does, under what conditions will it occur? In addition to Alberta's accomplishments thus far, what prospective accomplishments in the next 35 years will be celebrated in 2005? What kinds of problems will we and our children need to deal with in the future? Will we have the resources and abilities required to cope with the growing complexity of our world? What are the prospects?

Shall we look forward to an explosive future, filled with anxiety, fear and insecurity or can we look forward to a future in which current problems and issues are resolved? What can we do to bring about a preferred future? What can we do today, and what ought we to do tomorrow to create an exuberant society and a habitable world?

ORDERING THE FUTURE

In the past, Canadians have tended to approach the future passively. The style in dealing with problems in this tradition is reactive. As a consequence, changes in Canadian life have been incremental and gradual. As social, technological and economic change increases in rate and scale, a passive approach to the future tends to create large-scale lags between problem and solution. As a consequence, the future becomes increasingly explosive.

A second method for introducing the future is preemptive and exploitative in style. Using this approach, the attempt is to freeze the future in accordance with certain values and expectations. Revolutionaries attempt to freeze the future in terms of their particular ideologies; reactionaries, on the other hand, try to freeze it in accordance with historical forms and patterns.

The passive approach to introducing the future is no longer viable in a world of rapid and large-scale change; the preemptive or exploitative approach is generally unacceptable and undesirable. New ways of ordering the future must be developed and accepted.

There are a number of ways in which the future can be introduced in a more orderly way. In recent years there has been an increased emphasis on creating planning institutions and commissions, the creation of "futures" institutes and projects, and sponsorship of special growth projects. These means are indicators of a heightened desire to avoid explosive futures. Each of these developments has its own special problems and weaknesses. However, in combination, there is a possibility of creating a dynamic integration of forecasting, planning, and experimentation. Such an integration is desirable not only to avoid future crises but also to accomplish improved states of affairs.

STUDIES OF THE FUTURE

Studies of the future are intended to enlighten us on the probability, feasibility and possibility of events and conditions on various time horizons. The results of such studies have the effect of broadening the "frames of appreciation" which we use in perception and assessment. These studies assist us in linking the present with alternative sets of prospects. They foreshadow the future in terms of the present through a critique of the present.

Studies of the future are forecasting exercises. The forecasts which are the product of futures studies should not be taken in any way as prophecies. Prophecies are statements which describe those future states of affairs which will actually come about; forecasts, on the other hand, are statements about the future which may or may not come true, depending on a variety of factors, e.g., the continuation of present trends. Forecasts are, at best, probabilistic statements. If forecasts are assessed and are found to describe undesirable states of affairs in the future, there is no necessity that these undesirable conditions should come about. We could choose to intervene in historical processes to prevent them.

Many problems attend the methodology by which future studies are conducted. Each method, e.g., trend analysis, Delphi forecasting, the use of models, has its own set of difficulties. These problems need to be clearly understood in the assessment of the credibility of exploratory (descriptive) futures studies. In general, such studies cannot uncover the "unexpected," but must view the future as an extension of the present.

The Delphi technique involves interaction between knowledgeable or expert individuals. The Delphi technique has three basic features: (1) anonymity for panelists during the forecasting exercise; (2) controlled feedback to the panelists of opinions generated in the rounds of mailed interaction; and (3) statistically described group responses, i.e., the panel's or group's judgments are describable in statistical group scores. Anonymity is important to eliminate the influence of the socially dominant individuals in the group. Also, it reduces the potential for group pressure.

The first step in a Delphi study is to select highly informed or knowledgeable or expert individuals. (See the Methodological Appendix.) Once the selection is made, the panelists are mailed questionnaires which request forecast items. These forecast items, upon being returned, are collated and ordered. A second questionnaire is developed and sent back to the panelists for a detailing of the forecast, either in terms of probabilities or timing or substantive elaboration, or some combination of these three aspects of a forecast. At each stage of the interaction process the results of the previous stage are summarized and fed back to the members of the panel.

The net result of a Delphi exercise is a group description of the forecast. Most frequently this is done in statistical terms; in this report we have tried to describe group opinion in qualitative rather than quantitative ways.

THE FORECASTS

The purpose of this study was to prepare a series of forecasts on social phenomena which tend to have impact on education. The purpose was not to forecast the future of the educational system itself. The following topics were selected for the forecasting exercise:

(1) future changes in value and social goal orientations;
(2) the family in the future;
(3) leisure and recreation in the future;
(4) intercultural relations in the future: Native peoples;
(5) the future of politics; and
(6) the problems and needs of the individual in the future.

The forecasts in each of these areas have a time horizon of 35 years — from 1970 to 2005. The objective was to accomplish a certain breadth rather than depth, i.e., the attempt was to develop general forecasts and broad prospectives rather than detailed ones.

In many respects these forecasting exercises remain incomplete. The attempt here was to anticipate occurrences and trends, and assess, in a very rough way, their probabilities. No effort was made in the context of this study to determine the possible impacts the forecasts have on education, nor was any attempt made to evaluate the desirability of forecasted states of affairs. In these respects, this study is incomplete.

THE DELPHI PROCESS

To develop the forecasts a "group estimation technique" was used. This process is commonly known as the Delphi technique. It is based on the assumption that we cannot have knowledge, in the normal sense of that term, of the future and that speculation about the future is frequently of doubtful value. A third assumption is the use of opinion, "informed judgment" or "insight". Informed judgment or expert opinion is assumed in the Delphi technique to be an appropriate basis for the forecasting of future occurrences and states of affairs.

METHOD AND ANALYSIS

This study used only two rounds instead of the three or four iterations normally undertaken when using the Delphi technique. FORM A requested forecasts; FORM B requested a detailing of those forecasts collected in FORM A in terms of timing and probability, as well as rationale.

Two modes of analysis were used. First, the forecast items and the reasons given for them in FORM A and FORM B were sorted, collated and organized into short scenarios of two to three hundred words each. Secondly, a statistical analysis of trends and events (dates and probabilities) was undertaken. (See details in the Methodological Appendix.) These two sets of analyses are combined and condensed in this report.

The graphs need an explanation. Each of the plotted trends in a given graph represents a relatively homogeneous panel group or sub-group position. These lines are profiles for positions of sub-groups of panelists. The modal position is the average for the panel; a majority position is one subscribed to by the majority of panelists; a major position is subscribed to by no more than 50% and no less than 33% of

FORECAST PROFILES



Centralization in the internal government of industry.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————
MAJOR — — — — —
MINOR - - - - - -
MODAL ━━━━

the panelists; and a minority position represents homogeneous positions subscribed to by less than one third of the panelists.

Consider an illustration. On the opposite page is a profile of homogeneous positions taken on trends in the centralization of internal government in industry. The majority position is that there will be very little change between 1970 and 2005 in the degree to which internal governments in industry centralize. Another position taken by major proportion of panelists is that there will be a steady and appreciable increase in the degree of centralization in the internal government of industry between 1970 and 1980 and again between 1980 and 1990 and so on. The modal position, which is the average for the total panel, indicates a slight but steady trend towards centralization.

PRESENTATION

This report presents eleven sets of forecasts:

(1) Divisions in Canadian Society
(2) Value Change and Ideology
(3) The Family
(4) Religion
(5) Education
(6) Leisure and Recreation
(7) Politics
(8) Native Peoples
(9) Relations With Others
(10) Law and Disorder
(11) Mental Illness and Other Social Problems

Within each of these sections clusters of forecasts are given. First, the forecast or set of interrelated forecasts is stated and justified. The justification arises from panel opinion. Under "Alternate Panel Positions" or "Panel Opinions" there is a brief explanation of various positions which deviate from the forecast or which need further explanation for one reason or another.

The forecasts presented here are for Alberta, except in obvious instances. However, their relevance, for the most part, for all of Canada, is also evident.

DIVISIONS IN CANADIAN SOCIETY

PANEL CONCLUSIONS

During the 1970's and 1980's each of the current major divisions in Canadian society will grow wider. Opposing groups – the English and French, East and West, rich and poor, Red and White peoples, young and old, political extremist and moderate, and labour and management – will draw further apart. Although the widening of these divisions will not likely cause a demise of the Canadian nation during the next 35 years, the extent of Canadian unity and well-being depend largely on how effectively and how quickly these divisions can be arbitrated and narrowed. Will it take Canada two decades, or even longer, to arrest these trends? Do Canadians have the will and the resources in leadership and knowledge necessary to develop the new solidarities required not only to maintain, but to improve, the potential for unity and well-being?

It is along the cultural, regional, economic (income) and color lines that the most serious widening of divisions will take place in the future. In many respects, the seriousness of these divisions results from the fact that they reinforce each other. The rich-poor division is reinforced by the Red-White and Anglo-French division. To counter reinforcing cleavages with "criss-crossing" solidarities is, perhaps, this nation's highest priority.



Intensity of the "Anglo-French confrontation".



Intensity of the Western Canada-Quebec conflict over constitutional issues, including cultural and economic issues.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———————
MAJOR - - - - - - -
MINOR - - - - - - - - - -
MODAL ━━━━━━━

ANGLO-FRENCH DIVISION

FORECAST

Intensity of the Anglo-French confrontation will likely increase considerably during the next decade; by 1990 it should begin to diminish. Factors which will determine the extent of this division are: the acceptance by Canadians of the principles established by the Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism, the two nations concept, and the theory of special status for Quebec; the resolution of Quebec's economic development problems; and the emergence of "criss-crossing solidarities" which weaken class-ethnic partition within Quebec.

The intensity of the Anglo-French confrontation will probably parallel the intensity of the Western Canada-Quebec conflict on constitutional issues. The West will resist special status conditions and other Quebec demands for constitutional revisions, at least until approximately 1990.

PANEL OPINION

There are some substantial disagreements among our panelists on this forecast, primarily because of different assumptions about the timing and strength of effect of factors presumed to influence the Anglo-French division. The majority of panelists agree with the forecast, though there are differences on the degree of this division. There is a major portion of panelists who forecast a steady decrease in the Anglo-French confrontation. These panelists assume that the factors necessary to diminish this gap are already operative and effective. There is less disagreement about Western Canada's conflict with Quebec over constitutional issues – this conflict will increase during the 1970's and begin to level off and decline in the period after 1980.



Intensity and pervasiveness of Western alienation, i.e., ill-feeling towards the "eastern establishment"

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———
MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬
MINOR – – – – –
MODAL ———

EAST-WEST DIVISION

FORECAST

The intensity and pervasiveness of Western alienation will likely increase sharply in the 1970's, and appreciably during the following two decades. There is a 50% probability that by the early 1980's the organized movement for separation will emerge with sufficient strength to allow the Western provinces to assert the integrity of their unique culture and economy. There is some likelihood that the trend in Western alienation may be halted by the 1990's, if Federal policies are more responsive to Western Canada's needs and demands, and if economic links between the Canadian West and the American West are weakened rather than strengthened.

PANEL OPINION

The panelists adopted one of two major positions on this issue. The majority of panelists forecasted an appreciable and steady increase in Western alienation; another set of panelists felt that this trend would gradually plateau and diminish by 2005.



Degree of alienation between rich and poor in our society.



The proportion of people who are trapped in a state of poverty.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———
MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬
MINOR - - - - - - -
MODAL ━━━

RICH-POOR DIVISION

FORECAST

The proportion of people trapped in poverty will likely increase somewhat during the next three or four decades, while at the same time the degree and extent of economic dependence upon state by lower income groups will likely increase appreciably. Alienation between rich and poor will very likely increase, at least during the 1970's and 1980's. This trend may abate by 1990.

PANEL OPINION

There is general agreement among the panelists on the direction of trends pertaining to the economic dependence of lower socio-economic classes on the state and to the degree of alienation between rich and poor in our society. There is some disagreement on the degree of increase on both forecast items as well as on the timing of these increases. While the majority of panelists indicated an appreciable increase in economic dependance of lower socio-economic groups, a substantial number forecasted only a slight and gradual increase. The major difference in assumption between the two positions appears to be in the faith ascribed to economy to develop and redistribute income. Assumptions about the effectiveness of welfare and anti-poverty programs, including the redistribution effects of a variety of governmental policies, seem to divide the panelists in forecasting the degree of alienation between rich and poor.



Militancy among Native people to secure their guaranteed rights and freedoms.



White backlash to Native people's demands.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————

MAJOR – – – – –

MINOR - - - - - - - -

MODAL ━━━━

RED-WHITE DIVISION

FORECAST

An appreciable increase will occur in militancy among Native peoples to secure their guaranteed rights and freedoms, especially during the 1970's and 1980's, and probably also during the 1990's. An increase in white backlash to Native peoples' demands will parallel the increase in Native militancy. However, the white backlash will probably increase only slightly until 1990. The tensions between Red and White during the next several decades will likely not, however, lead to race riots. The development of urban ghettos populated by Native peoples, the availability of models of militancy, increased difficulties of meeting even the basic needs in the urban environment, and the response lag in government action and policy to Native needs will be conditions conducive to increased tension in the Red-White confrontation.

PANEL OPINION

There is considerable disagreement among the panelists on the intensity of white backlash during the next two decades. How visible and dramatic will the Red-White confrontation be in the 1970's and 1980's? How great a threat will Native peoples present to the white middle-class? The answers to these questions seem to divide the panel on this forecast. There is greater panel agreement on the extent of Native peoples militancy. However, two main positions diverge considerably, one forecasting a sharp increase in militancy, the other only a slight increase. The difference seems to stem from views about the "reasonableness" of Native leadership, on the one hand, and about the potential for mobilizing the Native population for militant action on the other.



Extent of discontent among youth.



The "Generation Gap".

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———————
MAJOR — — — — — —
MINOR - - - - - - - - -
MODAL ━━━━━━━

YOUNG-OLD DIVISION

FORECAST

The so-called "generation gap" is likely to increase somewhat during the next decade; during the 1980's and 1990's it will remain fairly stable. However, during the 1970's and 1980's the extent of discontent among youth will increase appreciably; during the 1990's this trend too will level off. There will be proportionately more youth in the population during the next two decades. It is likely that the relationship between the young and the old will not undergo rapid or fundamental change; the increase and extent of discontent among youth apparently has no dramatic impact on this relationship. Rather, youth will be increasingly discontented with the institutions which it confronts – schools, universitites, employing organizations. The inabilities of such institutions to be responsive to the needs of youth has been demonstrated in the past and there seems to be no reason to think that such institutions will be more effective in their response to youth in the future. Furthermore, increased unemployment among the young may contribute to heightened levels of discontent during the next two decades.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

The panelists agree on the direction of trends on the discontent among youth; they disagree considerably on the degree of increase. The major difference between the minority of panelists which forecasts a very sharp increase in discontent among youth and a major percentage of panelists who forecast only a slight increase is on the matter of radicalization of youth. The minority hypothesizes a very rapid radicalization of Canadian young people; the major position is based on the premise that those forces which tend towards radicalization will be offset very considerably in the years ahead.

A major subgroup of panelists forecast an appreciable increase in the generation gap between now and 1990. The majority forecasts no increase. The major position is connected with the forecast on the extent of discontent among youth. The radicalization of youth will, according to this position, increase rifts in values between young and old, and generate value conflicts which will widen the generation gap considerably.



Political extremism.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———
MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬
MINOR – – – –
MODAL ━━━

EXTREMIST-MODERATE DIVISION

FORECAST

Political extremism in Canada will increase appreciably in the next two decades. There will be a tendency in the 1990's for political extremism to be abated and reduced in its intensity. It is likely, however, that social, political, and economic change will produce heightened levels of aggression. If this aggression is externalized, there may be a tendency to follow extremist patterns of behavior, a tendency to adopt extreme right-wing or left-wing political postions. Increased extremism, on either the political right or left, will be expressed in mass political movements. For example, there is a 50% probability that by the late 1970's a popular political party representing the ideological right will have been formed. Furthermore, on the far left, it is just as likely that by the early 1980's a large-scale movement of consolidated Canadian oppressed and radical groups will have considerable impact on the political style of this country.

Major factors identified as those contributing towards political extremism are the following: the influence of American radicals and reactionaries on Canadian thought; the significance attached to a variety of issues which have long term effects, e.g., environmental quality; a set of cumulative dissatisfactions which occur as a result of confrontation with the "establishment"; and the inability and unpreparedness of individuals and groups in Canadian society to cope constructively with social and political change.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A minority of panelists forecast no change in the degree of political extremism in Canada. These panelists are persuaded that Canadian life has and will continue to have a high degree of solidarity.



Intensity and pervasiveness of industrial strife.

LEGEND
MAJORITY ——
MAJOR – – – –
MINOR - - - - -
MODAL ━━

LABOUR-MANAGEMENT DIVISIONS

FORECAST

The intensity and pervasiveness of industrial strife will probably increase in the future. Whether the increase will be appreciable or slight will depend on the effectiveness of means found to cope with technological change in industry and its consequences for the labouring class, and on procedures by which labour and management relate to each other in attempting to arrive at equitable and fair conditions. Union militancy will likely increase, especially if governments and industries fail to respond positively to technological advances which require less human labour, and socio-political developments which encourage greater "industrial democracy."

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A major proportion of panelists take the position that there will essentially be no change in the intensity and pervasiveness of industrial strife; a minority of panelists forecast a reduction in industrial strife, particularly after 1980. These two positions differ from the forecast in the assumption that industry and government will be at least as responsive, and perhaps more responsive, than it is at present to the institution "industrial democracy" and to problems of job displacement and employment. The minority of panelists forecast the development of a more functional industrial democracy than prevails today. This minority also forecasts large scale changes in governmental and industrial programs to accommodate earlier retirement, frequent retraining of the labour force, and fairness in working conditions and benefits.

INTEGRITY OF THE CANADIAN NATION

FORECAST

Despite the widening of divisions within Canada, it is likely that the integrity of the Canadian nation will endure. The possibility of Quebec secession is almost negligible. However, if secession occurs, it will be after the year 2005. Western separatism will never be a force strong enough to bring about secession from Confederation.

Provincial boundary changes are highly unlikely, except in the Maritimes. Maritime union is a distinct possibility by the mid-1980's. The redrawing of boundaries for British Columbia and the Prairie Provinces northward will likely not occur during the next 35 years.

The parliamentary system will remain in effect at least until 2005. At the 90% level of probability, a republican form of government will not be instituted in Canada. The party system of government will alter slightly, moving increasingly towards a two-party system with a distinctive ideological difference.

Several notable changes in Canada-United States relationships have been forecast at the 50% level of probability: the limitation of foreign investment in Canada by 1977; a Continental energy policy by 1978; the active participation in a large-scale, revised and comprehensive approach to Continental defence by 1987; and the institution of a reciprocal free trade policy with the United States by 1994. Political integration of Canada and the United States is not a possibility before 2005.

VALUE CHANGE AND IDEOLOGY

PANEL CONCLUSIONS

A complete shift in our value system and ideological orientation may occur in the very near future. Over the next 35 years, we will begin to notice a sharp upgrading in values pertaining to personal well-being, i.e., personal liberty and freedom, individuality and self-respect, health care, etc. Those values pertaining to the social well-being of the individual, i.e., social consciousness, welfare and humanitarianism, civil rights and legal equality, aesthetic and environmental appreciation, and a greater access to knowledge, will also be sharply upgraded. Values pertaining to personal material welfare, privacy, economic security and national prosperity will also be upgraded, although somewhat less sharply. These values too are part of the value reorientation which will cause the evolution of a "new Canada". Values related to nationalism, cultural pride and cultural identity will rise slightly only to diminish again after the 1980's. Values related to patriotism, capitalism and notions of private ownership will decrease considerably. In essence, what we can probably anticipate by the turn of the century is a government that is extremely devoted to the needs of the individual within that individual's social context. Such a transition will not come easily to the members of present-day society. The real question is can we and will we be ready to adapt to the changes which are to come?


1970
2005
Nationalism
1970
2005
Patriotism
LEGEND
MAJORITY
MAJOR
MINOR
MODAL

NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM

FORECAST

Nationalism may be upgraded somewhat during the next two decades, during the 1990's and thereafter this value will slowly and gradually be downgraded. Patriotism, on the other hand, will be steadily and increasingly downgraded during the next three or four decades. The major reasons for the upgrading of nationalism are: distrust for and dissatisfaction with the United States, increasing emphasis in the media and in governmental and educational programs on Canadian unity and identity, and the lessening of ties with countries of "origin". Patriotism will be downgraded largely because of the effect education, travel and the mass media will have on extending loyalties to international perspectives rather than national ones. Furthermore, the Canadian mosaic, especially if cultural identity is upgraded in the years ahead, contravenes the notion of patriotism. If patriotism will indeed be downgraded in the future, and if nationalism is upgraded, it then follows that the new nationalism will be a more enlightened and critical nationalism.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

The panel is clearly divided between three positions on the values ascribed to nationalism. Two major positions indicate an upgrading of nationalism. The disagreement between those panelists taking one or the other of these positions is on the weighting of factors contributing to the upgrading of nationalism. Those who argue that it will be downgraded point to factors which contribute to internationalism, e.g., concern for the survival of mankind, division between the "haves" and "have-nots" in society, and the breakdown of racial barriers.

Those who argue, contrary to the majority, that the values ascribed to patriotism will be steadily upgraded, point to increased involvement of Canadian citizens in their national affairs, and increased pride in national achievements.



National prosperity



Strength of opposition to the capitalist system in Canada.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ——————

MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬

MINOR — — — —

MODAL ▬▬▬▬▬

NATIONAL PROSPERITY AND CAPITALIST VALUES

FORECAST

There is a 50% probability that Canada will, by 1990, become as "socialistic" as Sweden in matters of national domestic policies. There is a 90% probability that this will have occured by the early 2000's. The strength of this opposition to the capitalist system in Canada will likely increase steadily over the next three decades; however, a consistent and united radical opposition to the capitalist system will probably never develop. It is almost certain that such an opposition will not develop sufficient strength to cause the rapid demise and eventual collapse of capitalism in Canada during the next three or four decades. Whatever economic structures may develop, values ascribed to national prosperity will still be steadily upgraded. This trend will develop as emphasis on the distribution of wealth to Canadians increases and as productivity as well as pride of resource ownership increases.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

That Canada will move away from a capitalist system as we know it today is almost a certainty. Opposition to this and the timing of the effect of the opposition in transforming the system is open to question. Two major positions emerge in the panel. One position is that the strength of opposition to the capitalist system in Canada will increase sharply particularly after 1980; the other position is that it will increase slightly until 1980 and decline thereafter. The relative priority of economic and environmental values indicates, and may well determine, the rapidity with which the capitalist system is transformed or eliminated. The relative priority of economic values as well as other values will also determine, to a large extent, the degree to which national prosperity is upgraded.



Extent of dissatisfaction with reduction in ownership.



Ownerships and property rights.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————

MAJOR — — — —

MINOR – – – –

MODAL ━━━━

OWNERSHIP

FORECAST

Values ascribed to ownership and property rights will likely be upgraded slightly during the next decade. Thereafter, these values will be steadily downgraded. The extent to which there is likely to be dissatisfaction with the reduction in ownership will likely follow the same trend. Rising costs, increased geographical mobility, and governmental policies pertaining to land use will contribute to the downgrading of ownership in the long-run. In the short-run, the decrease in availability of land and increasing wealth will promote the upgrading of these values. Reduction in ownership will bring about some dissatisfaction during the next two decades, because property will be viewed as a means for securing privacy and as a fulcrum for economic relationships. Adjustment to the reduction in ownership will occur as Canadians move away from our current system of ownership.

PANEL OPINION

Panelists were divided into three distinct positions on the item dealing with ownership and property rights. Essentially, those who forecasted an appreciable upgrading of these values were distinguished from those who forecasted an appreciable and steady downgrading, on their assumptions pertaining to the way in which increased wealth, redistribution of wealth, and changes in certain economic institutions would affect this set of values. The positions taken on the extent of dissatisfaction with reduction and ownership were distinguished essentially on assumptions pertaining to how quickly Canada would move toward a socialist economic structure. Those who assumed a rapid movement towards socialism forecasted a sharp and steady increase in this dissatisfaction; those who assumed a gradual movement in this direction forecasted only a slight increase in the extent of dissatisfaction with the reduction in ownership. The major position taken was that this dissatisfaction would increase on the short-run, but as people adjusted to reduction in ownership, this dissatisfaction would diminish.



Economic security.



Personal material welfare

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————
MAJOR — — — —
MINOR — — — —
MODAL ━━━━

ECONOMIC SECURITY AND PERSONAL MATERIAL WELFARE

FORECAST

Values ascribed to economic security and to personal material welfare will probably diverge increasingly during the next thirty years. Values pertaining to economic security will likely be somewhat downgraded, especially after 1980; values ascribed to personal material welfare will likely be upgraded steadily and slightly. The divergence between these two sets of values may come about because technology and resource use will continue to feed our aspirations with respect to comfort and material well-being, whereas the extension of opportunity for the underprivileged and the view that economic security should be a social right rather than a privilege, will both contribute to the emphasis of economic security.

PANEL OPINION

The panel is severely divided on these two items. Those who argue that there will be an upgrading of values pertaining to economic security point toward increasing competition for material wealth, a greater awareness of poverty and its consequences, and growing instability of basic economic units, as the major reasons for their position. Those who argue that values ascribed to economic security will be downgraded feel that the increasing absence of competitiveness among youth, increasing socialism and social welfare, and movement towards a guaranteed basic income will downgrade economic security. The downgrading of personal material welfare may come about, according to the panelists, as a result of the subordination of economic environmental values, and a de-emphasis on ownership.



Cultural pride and identity.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————

MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬

MINOR — — — —

MODAL ▬▬▬▬

CULTURAL PRIDE AND IDENTITY

FORECAST

There will likely be a slight upgrading of cultural values ascribed to cultural identity and cultural achievement during the next decade. During the following two or three decades, these values will be slightly but steadily downgraded. Factors which will contribute to the upgrading of these values are retention of languages, the rise of international cultural-social groups, increased pluralism which recognizes regional and ethnic orientations, and increased ethnic defensiveness in the face of assimilative forces. Factors tending towards the downgrading of cultural pride and cultural identity are multiple. Basic changes tending to weaken institutions which have traditionally transmitted cultural identity, the upgrading of values pertaining to the welfare of mankind rather than individual ethnic or cultural groups, and the effectiveness of the media in transmitting perspectives which tend towards the homogenization of perception and outlook, will all contribute to a "melting pot" trend in the future, particularly as the year 2000 draws closer.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

The panel is divided into three distinct positions. The two minor positions forecast directly opposite trends in values ascribed to cultural pride and identity. The majority position is essentially that given in the forecast presented above. The disagreement between the two minor positions is based on perspectives on future conditions mentioned above which tend towards either the upgrading or downgrading of these values.



Importance of individuality.



Self-respect

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————

MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬

MINOR – – – – –

MODAL ━━━━

INDIVIDUALITY AND SELF–RESPECT

FORECAST

Values ascribed to individuality and self-respect will likely be appreciably upgraded during the next 35 years. There will be increasing emphasis on the individual in schools, religion and government. There will likely be increased efforts by major institutions to reassert the basic values of democracy; values which include the notions of human dignity, self-respect and individuality. Their upgrading will be facilitated by an increasing tolerance for deviant behavior.

Individuality will be a major theme in our society's future. Individuality in education, religion, and the use of leisure time is a dominant concept in the new emerging consciousness.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A minority of panelists forecast no change in values ascribed to self-respect. The panelists argue that, in the future, the worth of the individual will be subordinated to the worth of the group to which he belongs. This kind of subordination will nullify the effects of factors which might otherwise tend to enhance self-respect.



Personal liberty



Government limitation of individual freedom and responsibility.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————
MAJOR — — — —
MINOR — — — —
MODAL ━━━━

PERSONAL LIBERTY

FORECAST

As government responsibility and limitations on individual freedom increase, the resulting "big brother" bureaucracy and loss of privacy will cause more concern for individual freedom and an upgrading of the values of personal liberty and freedom. Increasing emphasis upon individual choice in education, politics and leisure will tend to influence the upgrading of these values. The resurgence of certain democratic values in matters such as the quest for equality of minority groups, in institutions such as education, and in the political system, with increased emphasis on participation, will all contribute to this trend.

At the same time, there will be a certain degree of decline in individual freedom as a result of an expanding public sector with an accompanying increase in bureaucratization. Increased societal complexity will require government to play more of a regulatory role in interinstitutional and interpersonal relationships. In order to protect the freedom of others, the freedom of each individual will be somewhat reduced. This trend will contribute to the upgrading of values ascribed to freedom and liberty.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A minority of panelists, though they agree in the main with the forecast stated above, point out that a number of factors might tend to constrain the upgrading of these values. The increasing availability of socially legitimate freedoms for unorthodox behavior, a trend towards conservatism as a reaction to social change, and an increasing feeling that freedoms valued in the past will not be functional in the future, are possible trends which could constrain the valuation of freedom and liberty.



Privacy.



Invasion of privacy through data banks and monitoring devices.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———

MAJOR — — —

MINOR - - -

MODAL ━━━

PRIVACY

FORECAST

The values pertaining to privacy will be gradually and slightly upgraded during the next 35 years. Largely, this will come about as a reaction to the invasion of privacy and an increased awareness of such invasion. It is likely that a considerable amount of research will be produced during the next several decades on the effects of a variety of factors in privacy: increased population, computer coding, increasing socialization, increased crowding, and increased fear of the spectre of "big brother". The reduction of privacy will run counter to a number of other values which will be upgraded. There will be greater demands for self-expression, a greater quest for self-identity, and a heightened level of irritation and stress from feelings of lack of privacy.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A minority of panelists do not agree with the forecast above. There seem to be two arguments which emerge from this group. First, there are those in this minority who argue that the socialization process will in the future diminish the "need" for privacy. As a consequence there will be no feeling of sacrifice of privacy for social control in the future. A second argument is that in some way privacy and social control will become compatible ideals. There will be new ways, locales and methods for the exercise of privacy which will not violate the goals of social control.


1970
2005
Civil rights
1970
2005
Legal equality
LEGEND
MAJORITY
MAJOR
MINOR
MODAL

CIVIL RIGHTS AND LEGAL EQUALITY

FORECAST

Values ascribed to both civil rights and legal equality will be appreciably upgraded during the next 30 years. Civil rights will be emphasized increasingly as the emphasis on the individual in social contexts increases, as the theory of rights is extended to include opportunities of various sorts, as the educational system begins to teach seriously about minority groups and their perspectives on society, and as training in basic democracy becomes more effective. Also, the symbolic importance of governmental concern with rights will have its educative and mobilizing effects.

The value of legal equality will be upgraded as the public becomes more aware of the administration of justice. Furthermore, there are a number of movements which will continue to impress on the public consciousness the importance of equality. Such organizations include the Women's Liberation Front and Native peoples' interest groups.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

There was some disagreement on the panel as to the degree of upgrading of this set of values. A minority of panelists took the position that legal equality would be very slightly downgraded during the next two decades. The major reasons for this slight downgrading were the perpetuation of existing legislation and the difficulty of changing legislation which, in fact, discriminates against some people.



Availability of knowledge.

THE AVAILABILITY OF KNOWLEDGE

FORECAST

A sharp upgrading of values pertaining to the availability of knowledge will occur during the next 35 years. This trend will be expressed partly by rapidly soaring demands for education. However, it will also be affected by the availability of technology which will provide instant information. In fact, there will be a considerable exploitation of technological developments in making knowledge available during the next several decades. The availability of knowledge will also be valued, on one hand because of increased leisure time, and on the other because of its necessity in work. In addition to technical knowledge for both leisure and work, there will be an increased demand for knowledge about social problems. People in our society will want to understand and resolve various social problems.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A minority of panelists forecast only a slight upgrading of values ascribed to the availability of knowledge. Economic trends may result in a decrease of educational opportunity. If this occurs, then values pertaining to education and the availability of knowledge must be standardized downwards, i.e., downgraded. Certain panelists in this minority assume that we are moving toward an increasingly hierarchical society in which a technocratically oriented elite will be the only class which has a great demand for knowledge. The non-elites in such a society could easily develop an apathy towards learning.


1970
2005
Health care
LEGEND
MAJORITY
MAJOR
MINOR
MODAL

HEALTH CARE

FORECAST

There will be a sharp upgrading of values ascribed to health care between now and the turn of the century. The following factors are identified as significant in the upgrading of health care; the lack of qualified personnel in the future, rising standards and expectations on the part of the public, more research and greater availability of knowledge to the public regarding health care, the change in emphasis to preventative rather than corrective medicine, and the spread of a "fitness syndrome", i.e., a "beautiful people image."

It is noteworthy that values pertaining to health care are among those which will, comparatively, be most sharply upgraded in the future.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A minority of panelists forecast a slight upgrading of health care values until 1980, and a steady downgrading after that time. This minority of panelists argues that medical technology in the future, under public authority, will meet the demands for health care services, and thus cause a downgrading in these values. Other factors which may enter in the downgrading trend are; the possibility of genetic manipulation for improved health, education or individual responsibility for health and health care, and a growing inefficiency in large scale health services.



Aesthetic appreciation and enjoyment



Environmental appreciation

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————
MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬
MINOR — — — —
MODAL ▬▬▬▬

AESTHETIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES

FORECAST

Environmental appreciation will be sharply upgraded during the next three decades. Aesthetic values will also be upgraded, but not quite as sharply as environmental values. The major reasons for the sharp upgrading of environmental values include the effectiveness of conservation groups, public education on environmental quality, increased concern by the scientific community for the environment, the development of a social philosophy congenial to ecological balance and the lowering of the quality of the urban environment below accustomed and acceptable standards. The change in environmental values will be in conflict with industrial and commercial values and motives which have historically been accommodated in legislation. Consequently, resistance to the expression of upgrading of environmental values in regulatory and legislative actions will occur. There will, in other words, be anti-innovation forces constraining the forecast trends.

The increasing amount of leisure time, the increasing value placed on participation, and the development of new communication media and appropriate facilities, will all contribute appreciably to a sharp upgrading of aesthetic values. Aesthetic appreciation programs in the schools will also facilitate this trend. If aesthetic appreciation is expressed in participative ways, many of the constraints on aesthetic enjoyment will have been removed for many more people.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

There was a high degree of agreement on the forecasted trends with respect to aesthetic values. A number of panelists expressed skepticism about an appreciable or sharp upgrading of aesthetic values. They point out that the majority of the public are extremely inflexible when it comes to the arts and participating in creative self-expression. One reason for this inflexibility is the high aspirations with respect to the standard of living. This results in a great deal of moonlighting and the use of leisure time for work.



Social consciousness and welfare



Humanitarianism.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———

MAJOR — — — —

MINOR – – – –

MODAL ━━━

SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS, WELFARE AND HUMANITARIANISM

FORECAST

Values ascribed to welfare, humanitarianism, and social consciousness or awareness will likely be appreciably and steadily upgraded in the years ahead. The reasons indicated for the upgrading of this set of values are as follows: increase in knowledge about other peoples, a trending away from agressiveness, revision in the priorities pertaining to material goods and people, more effective and realistic education about social conditions, and more intensive confrontation between the "haves" and "have-nots" in our society.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

These forecasted trends may be constrained, according to some panelists, if minimal income plans are adopted and the present negative welfare programs are abandoned, if there is increased emphasis on individuality and individual achievement, and "training in selfishness" becomes increasingly ineffective in schools and businesses.

THE FAMILY

PANEL CONCLUSIONS

The nuclear family will persist. It will, however, undergo substantial changes. The values pertaining to the permanence of marriage will likely continue to be downgraded. Fundamental modification in parental roles as a consequence of changes in work and leisure will have a considerable impact on family structure and child-rearing practices. Increasingly, child-rearing will become the responsibility of agencies outside the home, especially as increasing numbers of mothers enter the labor force. Parents will have even less influence on their children in the future. Peer groups will gain greater control over socialization processes.

Birthrates will probably decline, but not sufficiently enough to avoid increased governmental regulation of parenthood towards the end of the century. However, before governments become directly involved in population control, they will use a number of monetary and educational leverage points to regulate birthrates.



The proportion of the population which believes that a marriage should last "until death do us part".



Domestic values (love, pride, devotion).

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———————
MAJOR ━ ━ ━ ━ ━
MINOR – – – – – –
MODAL ━━━━━━━

DOMESTIC VALUES AND THE PERMANANCE OF MARRIAGE

FORECAST

Although it is likely that the proportion of the population which believes that a marraige should last "until death do us part" will decline appreciably during the next three and one half decades, there is no clear judgment as to whether or not domestic values – love, pride, devotion – will be upgraded or downgraded. Those who argue that domestic values will be upgraded propose the following reasons: the increased need for security on the part of the individual will bring about a gradual return to the pre-1950 nuclear family; there will be better socialization and family values; religious values concerning the family will undergo reinterpretation which will favor domesticity. Those who forecast a downgrading of domestic values counter with the following proposals: changes in existing family structure will modify all values pertaining to the family, including domestic values; there will be an increasing mobility of family members; there will be an increasing social acceptance of less regular family relationships; the lack of support of family values in the institutional arrangement of the business and professional worlds will continue.

It is clear, however, that values pertaining to the permanence of marriage will likely be downgraded during the next 30 to 40 years. This value has already been considerably downgraded. The downgrading will continue as a result of fundamental changes in family structure.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

The panelists are highly agreed on the item pertaining to the permanence of marriage; they are, however, divided on the question of whether or not domestic values will be upgraded.



Birthrate.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————

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BIRTHRATE

FORECAST

The birthrate will likely decline steadily and substantially during the next three decades. In fact, by the early 1980's, the average family size will probably have been reduced to two children; this state of affairs is almost a certainty by 1990.

The major factors in the birthrate reduction are the following: an increase in the rate of male sterilization; an increase in the rate of rejection by women of the option of bearing children; the increase in trends towards a variety of marriage forms, e.g., plural marriages and trial marriages, which inhibit the choice of bearing children.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A substantial number of panelists are in some disagreement with the forecast above. They forecast a slight increase in the birthrate in the 1970's, resulting from a disillusionment with currently available artificial birth control techniques, especially the "pill," with its side effects. Another factor which may contribute to a slight birthrate increase during the next decade is a proportionately large segment of the population that will come into the child-bearing age category.



The proportion of heterosexual unions which are made for companionship only.



Rejection by women of the option of bearing children.

LEGEND

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POPULATION CONTROL

FORECAST

Increasing numbers of women will reject the option of bearing children, as pointed out in the previous forecast. The proportion of heterosexual unions which are made for companionship only will increase appreciably, especially during the next two decades. In addition to these trends, there will be a movement from an educational strategy to a more legalistic control strategy in population control. The schedule for the development of this program is as follows (at the 50% level of probability):

Mid-1970's:	the introduction of sex education and marriage preparation programs in the public schools; general availability of improved birth control techniques;
Late 1970's:	the end of family allowances;
Early 1980's:	the legalization of abortion at the discretion of the prospective mother;
Early 1990's:	the introduction of more scientific approaches to family planning decisions;
Early 2000's:	the introduction of licenses for parenthood;
After 2005:	a legal limitation on family size.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

There is relatively little disagreement among the panelists on these forecasts and on the timing of the events in the forecasts. A number of panelists question the degree to which the proportion of heterosexual unions for companionship only will increase. The majority of panelists forecast only a slight increase in the rejection by women of the option of bearing children. These panelists argue that educational programming and socialization processes in our society, especially for the female sex, do not enforce values favorable to this option.



1970 2005
The salience of father's responsibilities in child-rearing.



1970 2005
Amount of time mothers will devote to child-rearing.

LEGEND

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PARENTAL ROLE CHANGES

FORECAST

Maternal and paternal roles in child-rearing will become increasingly similar between now and the end of the century. A decrease in the amount of time spent by fathers at "work" will result in their increased participation in domestic activities. The amount of time mothers will devote to child-rearing, on the other hand, will diminish as mothers participate more actively in the labour market and in community activities. There will be, then, a blurring of maternal and paternal roles in child-rearing obligations.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

There is general agreement among the panelists that the amount of time mothers will devote to child-rearing will diminish. There is some disagreement about the rapidity of this change. There is a considerable amount of disagreement on trends pertaining to the salience of the father's role in child-rearing. Two groups of panelists, making up the majority, agree with the forecasts stated above; however, they disagree on the rate of change. Another major group of panelists forecasts the opposite trend, namely, that the father's responsibilities in child-rearing will become less important over time. Their argument is that fathers will have increased responsibilities in continuing education as an aspect of their careers, and that increased opportunities for recreation for those fathers who are not away from home frequently will take the father out of the household.



Family influence on the emotional development of the young.



Family control over socialization of the young

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FAMILY INFLUENCE ON CHILD-REARING

FORECAST

There will likely be more permissiveness in the family of the future; as part of this trend, the influence of the family on the emotional development of the young and control over the socialization of the young will decline. The influence of the work-ethic on child-rearing and family formation will likely decrease appreciably in the coming decades, whereas the influence of peer groups on the up-bringing of children will increase considerably. Children will spend more time away from their parents, perhaps in an institutional setting conducive to peer group development. The solidarity of such peer groups will be especially strong in areas in which social and geographical mobilitiy is low, and homogeneity of social class and ethnicity is high.

Peer groups among older children will be more important because of the accordance of quasi-adult status at a much earlier stage, and because there will be less public concern over who should assume responsibility for the children outside the family context. More formal control over child upbringing will be vested in the school system.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A minority of panelists forecasts an increase in family influence on the emotional development of the young; a major percentage of panelists forecast only a very slight decline. Also, a major proportion of panelists forecasts only a slight decline in family control over the socialization of the young. This decrease will come primarily after 1990. These positions are in some disagreement with the forecast above. The major premise on which this disagreement rests is that family solidarity will be enhanced over the next three decades, or at least not diminished.



The use of supplementary child-rearing services rendered by professionally trained personnel.



Demand for day care centers

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CHILD CARE

FORECAST

The demand for day care centres will likely increase sharply during the next decade or two; after 1990, the demand will diminish. The use of supplementary child-rearing services rendered by professionally-trained personnel will increase appreciably during the next two decades, but will also diminish or stabilize during the 1990's.

Furthermore, it is likely that supplementary child care by professionally trained personnel will increasingly replace present day care and baby-sitting services. In the future, shortly after birth, children will be sent to community-located child care centres. These will be similar to present day care centres, although the personnel will be more highly trained, will provide more care suited to the needs of individual children, and will have more skills necessary for providing aid in bringing up children. These specialists will also be able to help children and families with special problems. As a consequence, parents who want to devote more time to their careers without losing contact with their children will leave their infants and pre-school children at centres of this type and pick them up "after work."

The present preponderance of negligent parents, unreliable and undependable baby-sitting services, inadequate day care facilities, and the general disenchantment with these facilities by parents and children alike, will contribute to this development. In addition, maternal employment will continue to increase substantially; the numbers of employed single male or female parents will increase; services will be increasingly requested by persons not interested in taking care of their children; and disadvantaged and multi-problem families will require substitutionary child care services. These factors will contribute to the development of this trend.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

The profiles of panel positions all point in the same direction with respect to these forecasts. There is a considerable amount of disagreement on the degree of increase, particularly of day care centres. A minority position suggests only a slight increase in the demand for day care centres. This minority of panelists rejects the view that there wiil be both increased public responsibility for child-rearing, and sufficient change in the family to give rise to higher levels of demand.



Participation of women in the labour force.



Entrance of women into the professions.

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WOMEN IN THE LABOUR FORCE AND PROFESSIONS

FORECAST

Women will likely increase their participation in both the professional and non-professional sectors of the labour force during the next 35 years at approximately the same rate. Although the size of the labour force relative to the population will decrease, the proportion of women in occupations not requiring physical strength will increase. Many women will choose business and professional careers as major life activities, and their co-equality with men in these situations will gradually be accepted. Many women will not choose to marry in the future, or, if they do, will choose not to have children. As a consequence, they will be free to choose their own place in society. Supplementary child care facilities will prompt more women to choose careers. The decline of the male role dominance in the home will lead to the diminution of the prevailing expectation that women should assume subordinate roles. This factor will also encourage a proportionate increase in the employment of women.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

Panelists are fairly well agreed on the forecasts pertaining to the entrance of women into the professions. A major proportion of panelists forecasts a sharp increase; a majority forecasts a slight to appreciable increase. There is also some divergence of opinion concerning the likely rate of increase of participation of women in the non-professional categories. The majority forecasts an appreciable increase, while a major percentage of panelists forecasts only a very slight increase. Those who see a rapid increase in the entrance rate of women into the professions make their forecasts on primarily two factors: the demand for participants in the service professions, and the relatively easy opportunity for women, including married women with children, to enter those professions.

There has been an increase in the rate of female entrance into professional schools and institutions of higher learning during the last several decades. This trend will likely continue.

Those who forecast only a slight increase in the participation of women in the labour force assume only a modicum of change in family and occupational structure to allow increased opportunity for women.



Divorce rate.



Incidence of marriage breakdown.

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MARRIAGE BREAKDOWN

FORECASTS

The incidence of marriage breakdown during the next three decades will likely undergo appreciable increase. There is a possibility that after 1990 the rate of marriage breakdown will stabilize. The same trend is forecast for the divorce rate. The incidence of marriage breakdown and the divorce rate will increase for the next two decades, for the following reasons: mutual consent will constitute adequate grounds for a legal divorce; changing women's roles and increasing financial independence resulting from increased education will make women capable of supporting themselves and of raising children, with limited assistance; alimony payments will be eliminated in most cases; and, as the male population will continue to hold many of the traditional sex attitudes, many men will not be able to adjust to marriages in which wives expect co-equality. The divorce rate will then decrease, as those who wish permanent marriages will have to undergo special training, especially if they desire children. Mate selection will be made less haphazard through the use of improved tests, and people will be more cautious about marriage, as many of the rewards of the present marital relationship will be available in alternate situations.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A major proportion of panelists forecast a minor increase in the incidence of marriage breakdown. A minor group of panelists forecast a slight increase in the divorce rate. The major difference between these positions and the forecasts above is in the rate of change in those factors which will shape the trend on these items. The majority positions seem to assume fairly rapid change; the more conservative estimates assume slower rates of change in these variables.



Incidence of the number of communes.

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COMMUNAL LIVING

FORECAST

There is a 50% probability that by the early 1990's communes will be widely accepted living arrangements. The trend towards the establishment of communes will increase slightly and steadily over the next three to four decades. In urban areas, it will not be unusual, in the future, to develop communal living arrangements for two or more separate nuclear families. These arrangements will usually be based on a system of economic cooperation between close friends or relatives who wish to share living quarters. Such a pooling of economic resources will permit a better standard of living and a more efficient system of household management and child-rearing. If this form of communal living in the urban areas becomes widespread, land use patterns will be changed considerably.

Retreatist rural communes will likely be formed by "liberal" career-oriented professionals who become disillusioned with urban life. These communes will probably be unstable. They will involve limited common ownership of productive and service facilities. They will be formed primarily by upper middle class, organization-bound professionals who have accumulated a certain amount of wealth. Such communes will cooperate in the production of food and in the education of children. These communes will be unstable because they will not be sufficiently isolated and economically independent of urban society, and the children will acquire values appropriate to urban society from their parents, thus diminishing the degree of solidarity which communes of this kind require.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

There is general agreement on the movement towards an increase in the number of communes, and an increase in the proportion of the population which will live in such arrangements. However, there is once again a difference in judgment about the rate of change in this direction. Those who argue for a very slight increase in communal living point out that communes have not yet proven themselves to be viable living arrangements. Consequently, increasing numbers of individuals and families living in communes will become disillusioned, largely because of the consequence of earlier socialization for behavior patterns and values which are contrary to communal living.

RELIGION

PANEL CONCLUSIONS

Religious values are deep seated in our culture. Although specific religious values or values within a particular religious framework, such as values ascribed to a supreme being and to denominational participation, may be downgraded in the future, the potential for a religious revival in the years ahead will steadily increase. In the future, greater value will be placed on the self as a religious phenomenon as well as on individually acquired religious experiences through such media as meditation, yoga, and drugs. There will be an increased emphasis on self-emulation and self-concern, rather than self-debasement in the religion of the future. The theme of community of man will also be given greater emphasis. These points of increased emphasis may form the roots of conflict in religious thought both at the individual or personal, and institutional levels.



Supreme Power

Existential self

SELF AND SUPREME POWER

FORECAST

The values ascribed to a supreme power, or to a belief in a supreme power, will probably be steadily downgraded in the future; values ascribed to the concept of an existential self will likely be upgraded appreciably during the next several decades. The reasons for these two value changes are the same: there will be an increased emphasis on the individual's rationality and personality in matters of value and action; education will increasingly emphasize the self; there will be an increased realization that self-identity and religious authority are independent of each other; there will be an increased cultural as well as a religious pluralism, as a result of greater contact with other major religions and cultures; and lastly, there will be a demise of symbolic authority in traditional religions.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A major group of panelists forecast a steady upgrading of the values ascribed to supreme power; a minority of panelists forecast a steady and appreciable downgrading of values ascribed to the existential self. These panelists argue that the increasing complexity of society will cause individuals to pursue meaning beyond the self. The awesomeness of a complex world will emphasize belief, and consequently, there may well be a return to certain forms of traditional religion. Some panelists argue that traditional religions will be revised to offer a better definition of a supreme power, one which allows better perspectives on human ambiguities and recognizes the interrelatedness of man in the here-and-now.



Degree of return to traditional forms of religiousness by individuals.



Denominational participation

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RELIGIOUS TRADITIONALISM AND DENOMINATIONAL PARTICIPATION

FORECAST

There will likely be a turning away from traditional forms of religion during the remainder of this century. This will be reflected, partly, in a downgrading of values ascribed to denominational participation. Among the reasons for this forecast are the following: there will emerge more multi-denominational churches and church unions; there will be a greater realization of the irrelevance of theology towards social needs and problems; religious symbolism will be increasingly considered as outmoded; there will be a continued disintegration of current religious organizations and form.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A minority of panelists feel that there will likely be a return to traditional forms of religiosity. There will be an increased need for spiritual guidance, a desire for personal conviction, more denominations, a natural selection of denominations able to contribute to personal growth and development, and an increased religious participation as a result of the enhanced values ascribed to participation generally. Indeed, this minority forecasts a religious revival in our society which will express itself in traditional forms.



New pervasive religious revival in some form.

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RELIGIOUS REVIVAL

FORECAST

The prospect of a new and pervasive religious revival in some form will likely be enhanced between now and 2005. Despite the increased values ascribed to self, the quest for religious meaning will intensify in a society where goals and values are difficult to acquire, and where role confusion may be abundant. If such a religious revival does take place, it will probably not have the same forms of revival as we know them today. Such a revival will reinstitute certain types of religious values, as yet unspecified, which will answer the unknown and provide order for individuals.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A major group of panelists forecast no change in the potential for a religious revival in some form; a minority of panelists see a sharp decline in conditions which will make for a religious revival. The major position is predicated on the assumption that factors which contribute to the likelihood of a religious revival will be counteracted by factors not conducive to such a phenomenon. For example, feelings of fear, frustration and insecurity, as well as severe social dislocation, will be counteracted by opportunities to participate in various aspects of social and political change, relative economic security, and so on. The minority position forecasts a decline in the individual's concern for meaning and purpose. There will be, in this view, an increasing degree of apathy and alienation even in matters pertaining to being.



Emphasis on harmonizing rather than self-debasing spiritual experiences.



Emphasis on the community of man in religion.

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NEW RELIGIOUS EMPHASIS

FORECAST

There will probably be an increased emphasis on harmonizing rather than self-debasing spiritual experiences, and on the community of man in religion in the future. It is likely that religious institutions will adopt these emphases, but the increased importance of these sorts of perspectives and experiences will also be derived from the increased participation in various forms of individually obtained religious experience, such as meditation, yoga, and drugs. Religion in the future will be viewed by many as being more related to their needs for self-esteem and for wholesome relationships to others.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A major subgroup of panelists forecast only a slight change in emphasis on harmonizing rather than self-debasing spiritual experiences; a minority of panelists forecast only a slight change in the emphasis on the community of man in religion of the future. Certain of these panelists feel that contemporary religion already has these emphases, and will not likely increase. Other panelists, some of whom forecast a decline in the potential for religious revival, altogether dismiss the need for these perspectives and experiences from religious sources.

EDUCATION

PANEL CONCLUSIONS

The educational system will be more responsive to social changes and the needs of students in the future. Despite efforts to reform educational institutions, student and public disaffection with educational institutions will increase. The inability of the public sector to meet the rising demands for education, particularily post-secondary and continuing education, may contribute to increased disaffection with educational institutions. Nothing short of a radical approach to overhauling the fundamental structures and processes of the educational system will be necessary in the years ahead. Furthermore, it may be necessary for governments and other institutions to sponsor a restandardization downwards of values now ascribed to education.



Authoritarianism in education.



Student participation in education decision-making.

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AUTHORITARIANISM IN EDUCATION

FORECAST

There will be an appreciable decrease in the degree of authoritarianism in education during the next three decades. Concomitantly, student participation in educational decision-making will increase steadily, thus increasing the degree of responsibility on the part of the student for his own education. This forecast takes into account a number of factors; increased awareness of successful educational experiments which tend to move away from authoritarianism, increased emphasis on participation in our society, upgrading of values pertaining to individuality and the heightened threat of unrest. Teachers, professors and administrative officials in the educational system will, as a result of this trend, experience considerable difficulties in readjusting administrative structures and roles appropriate to the democratized educational system.

PANEL OPINION

The panel is agreed almost entirely on this forecast. Authoritarianism in education will likely decline more rapidly in the years ahead in comparison with the increase in student participation in decision-making. There is some range of opinion as to the rapidity or degree of change in the authoritarian structure of educational institutions. These differences of opinion are based on views pertaining to the ability of educational institutions to change, as well as to the opportunity to do so. Public opinion will likely be an important factor constraining the degree of educational democratization.



Education for creativity, environmental studies, and education about interpersonal relationships.



Educational resources – mobilizing students for social change.

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EMPHASIS IN EDUCATION

FORECAST

It is likely that there will emerge a number of new emphases in the programs of educational institutions. Education for creativity, environmental education, education in interpersonal relationships, education for sound mental health development, and education for participating in social change processes will have their emphasis upgraded between now and the year 2000. By the mid 1970's sex education and marriage preparation programs will likely have been introduced in the public school program. Furthermore, though educating people to use leisure time will not become a primary emphasis in school programs until after 2005, it is likely schools will become the primary leisure centers in the community by 1990, both in terms of education for leisure and providing opportunity for leisure activities. It appears that educational institutions will, in the future, be somewhat more responsive to changes in values and social conditions.

PANEL OPINION

There is a high level of unanimity among panelists on the forecasted changes in educational emphases. The panel divided most sharply on the item pertaining to mobilizing students on behalf of social change. There is unanimous agreement that more educational resources will be used for this purpose. However, there is some disagreement as to the degree to which our educational institutions will be willing to commit resources for this purpose.



Demand for post-secondary education.



Leisure time for continuing education (all types adult).

LEGEND
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DEMAND FOR POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION

FORECAST

By the early 1990's it is likely that the average person will spend half of his lifetime engaged in organized educational pursuits. Consequently, it is likely that the demand for post-secondary education will increase sharply over the next three decades, as will the use of leisure time for continuing education. There may be some leveling-off in the demand for post-secondary education after 1980; the leveling-off effect for the use of leisure time in continuing education may take place after 1990. It may be possible some time after the end of the next decade to restandardize values ascribed to post-secondary education and to continuing education so as to diminish this demand. But this could be accomplished only by a vast variety of means, e.g., diversifying roles within the professions, breaking down the division between work and leisure, encouraging self-education, providing greater opportunities for on-the-job training and education.

PANEL OPINION

On both forecasts there is a high degree of unanimity among panelists. Disagreement seems to lie in the timing of the leveling-off of demand for post-secondary and continuing education. If both public and private sectors initiate and are effective in sponsoring a de-emphasis on post-secondary and continuing education, then the minority panel opinion may very well obtain. If such initiatives are not taken, or if they are not effective, the majority position may obtain. It is questionable whether our society has the resources to meet a continued and appreciable increase in the demand for education.



Disaffection among youth with institutions of higher learning.

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DISAFFECTION WITH HIGHER LEARNING

FORECAST

It is likely that there will be continued and appreciable increases in the degree of disaffection among youth with institutions of higher learning during the 1970's and 1980's. It is possible that by the last decade of this century the degree of this disaffection will plateau or even somewhat subside. Student disaffection with the methods and styles of education will continue until such time as very basic changes are made in the educational system. At the same time that authoritarianism will likely break down in educational institutions, student participation in education decisions will increase, disaffection among students and youths will intensify. Student disaffection will, in other words, outrun advances in educational reform.

PANEL OPINION

Three major positions were taken on this forecast. The first position indicates an appreciable and steady increase in disaffection within institutions of higher learning. The second position indicates a similar steady and appreciable increase until 1990, after which time student disaffection will level off. The third position indicates an appreciable increase in disaffection in the 1970's and a steady decline thereafter. The distinction between these three positions is the degree of panel optimism about the opportunity, ability and will of institutions of higher learning to change and accommodate reform.



Degree of university self-government.

UNIVERSITY SELF-GOVERNMENT

FORECAST

The degree of power which universities will have for self-government will likely remain fairly steady during the 1970's. After this it will increase slightly but steadily during the following two decades. During the 1970's universities will find it difficult to maintain their present powers for self-government in the face of public dissatisfaction with campus unrest, financial burden and their ineffectiveness to provide the skills and knowledge necessary to cope with the major social and economic problems. However, as the university undergoes some fairly basic reforms, the demand for the development of more stringent political controls on institutions of higher learning will subside.

PANEL OPINION

Panel opinion was divided substantially on this forecast. A strong position was taken by a minority of panelists that the degree of university self-government would decline slightly in the 1970's and sharply thereafter. This minority argued that the university would continue to discredit itself as a viable research and educational institution. Consequently, the political system would restrict the universities' powers considerably in the decades ahead. The majority of panelists however were somewhat more optimistic about the ability of the university to transform itself and to protect itself from political intervention.

LEISURE AND RECREATION

PANEL CONCLUSIONS

Two broad alternative concepts of leisure emerge in this forecasting exercise. In one view, the present work-leisure dichotomy will be maintained; in the second, this distinction will lose most of its significance.

The first view anticipates that no foreseeable change in economic development will permit the restructuring of job tasks or work situations sufficiently to allow a change in the differentiation between work and leisure. It also assumes that the present rate of economic growth and technological progress is not sufficient to permit any radical reduction of the labour force before the year 2000. Under these conditions there appears to be a sharp and continuing distinction between work and leisure, a by-product of the "Protestant work-ethic". This means that most people will still "work" and then "play" in the year 2000.

The second view posutlates considerable economic development and technological innovation; enough, in fact, to create a drastic reduction in the size of the labour force. This reduction will produce concomitant changes in the amount and distribution of leisure and work time. More than likely a guaranteed annual income will be provided for those persons who might be unemployed, the so-called "leisure drop-outs". Eventually the Protestant work-ethic will break down and a self-fulfillment ethic will probably develop. "Work" will be used to further the objective of the self-fulfillment ethic in the same way that leisure is now used by some individuals. The distinction now drawn between work and leisure will therefore lose much of its meaning. Work will become a much sought after and pleasurable experience and will not be divorced from other daily activities. Many of these developments, if in fact they do occur, will begin in the 1990's, and work and leisure will be fully amalgamated before the year 2000.

MEAN ESTIMATES OF TIME SPENT WORKING AND VACATIONING, BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES, 1975-2005

CATEGORIES	1975	1980	1990	2005
Length of Work Day (in hours)				
Professional-Managerial	7.9	7.6	6.8	6.3
White Collar	6.9	6.9	5.6	5.0
Skilled Labour	7.0	5.7	5.4	5.0
Unskilled Labour	7.4	6.9	5.5	5.1
Length of Work Week (in hours)				
Professional-Managerial	40	38	33	31
White Collar	34	28	26	24
Skilled Labour	34	28	25	22
Unskilled Labour	37	34	27	24
Annual Vacation (in weeks)				
Professional-Managerial	4.3	5.1	6.2	7.7
White Collar	3.8	4.5	5.5	7.5
Skilled Labour	3.5	4.5	5.8	7.8
Unskilled Labour	3.0	3.7	4.9	5.8
Average Age of Entry into The Labour Force				
Professional-Managerial	26	27	28	28
White Collar	21	22	23	24
Skilled Labour	21	21	22	22
Unskilled Labour	18	18	19	24
Average Age of Retirement				
Professional-Managerial	63	60	57	53
White Collar	62	59	56	53
Skilled Labour	61	58	55	52
Unskilled Labour	62	59	57	55
Rate of Unemployment	9.2%	10.0%	18.4%	32.7%

The table above summarizes data pertaining to the availability of leisure time by occupational categories. The Occupational categories presented here may also be interpreted as social class indicators. While the table in many ways speaks for itself, some elaboration is warranted. This table is based on the assumption that the current concept of "leisure time," as distinct from "work time," will prevail.

AMOUNT AND DISTRIBUTION

FORECAST

The decreasing proportion of time spent in occupational endeavor, as opposed to that spent in leisure is apparent in the table. Although the amount of daily leisure time will probably increase steadily within the next 35 years, increase will be greater in descending order across categories. The unskilled labourer, for example, will have the greatest increase in leisure time per work day. No reduction in the number of work days per week is anticipated.

Length of annual vacation will probably increase for all categories. The present longer vacation for the professional-managerial class will be eclipsed by the length of vacation of the skilled labour class. The length of vacation for white collar workers will be slightly shorter than that for the professional-managerial group. The length of vacations for unskilled labourers will not increase at the same rate as those of other groups.

The average age of entry into the labour force will probably increase slightly for all but the unskilled labourer. This group's entry age may rise dramatically, especially from 1980 onwards. The large discrepancy in entry age between unskilled workers and workers in other groups will, therefore, be eliminated by 2005. By then, the skilled worker will be entering the labour force at a much younger age than others.

Retirement age will probably decrease. The average age of retirement in 2005 will be about 53, except for unskilled workers, who will retire at age 55.

Forecasted early retirement and deferred entry into the labour force will diminish the worker's total "work life."

Increased unemployment is also forecasted throughout the study period. The rate of increase rises sharply after 1980. By the year 2005 almost one-third of the labour force will probably be unemployed.

Changes in the amount and distribution of leisure time will affect the skilled and unskilled labouring groups much more dramatically than the other groups. Skilled labour in the future will become a "leisure elite," because of gains in free time, and increased opportunity to pursue activities outside of the occupational situation.



Involvement in the uses of leisure time for purposes of education.



Adult involvement in international education.

LEGEND

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EDUCATION FOR LEISURE

FORECAST

The extent of involvement to all forms of education in the pursuit of leisure time will increase dramatically in the future. There will probably be an appreciable increase in the use of leisure time for education generally, as well as a similar increase in the use of leisure time for purposes of continuing education and retraining. By the early 1990's, the average person could possibly spend half of his lifetime engaged in organized educational pursuits. These pursuits may be private, formal, or on-the-job. Adult involvement in education for the use of leisure time may also become a reality, but not before the year 2005.

Even with this sort of involvement, leisure time will still remain a problem. The importance of community education centres, study time on company time, and technological advances accompanied by improved facilities, are all factors that will contribute to the meteoric rise of interest in education.

ALTERNATIVE PANEL POSITIONS

Only slight divergence appears in the forecasts. Differences in panel opinions concerning the use of leisure time for purposes of education are largely attributable to differences in the conception of the work-leisure dichotomy. Those panelists who feel that the work-leisure dichotomy will break down predict a levelling-off of involvement in education. The levelling-off effect in this case will be caused by people who wish to discontinue their education because it will not be necessary or required to achieve professional or occupational status. Adult involvement in international education will probably continue to increase sharply, gaining momentum in the later years of the century. This will occur as "internationalism" becomes more pronounced. This trend will not likely be affected by the work-leisure dichotomy.



The use of leisure time for individualized activities.



The use of leisure time for group activities.

LEGEND

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INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP ACTIVITIES

FORECAST

There will quite likely be an appreciable to sharp increase in the use of leisure time for purposes of self-actualization, self-integration and mental development, intellectual pursuits and individual involvement in inter-group and human relations problems. Similarily, interests in the use of leisure time for sporting activities which can be practiced in isolation will increase appreciably to sharply in the future. The use of leisure time for creative pursuits, however, including interests in hobbies and pursuits involving manual dexterity will increase only appreciably. Almost all leisure time activities which involve the individual attainment of goals will increase appreciably to sharply over the next 35 years.

The use of leisure time for activities involving group participation will also appreciably increase. Leisure time use for group activities involving spectator sports, festivals, and celebrations, however, are likely to increase only slightly over the next 35 years. Participation in group activities will probably begin to diminish sometime in the early 1980's. The use of leisure time for individual activities, on the other hand, will probably be increasingly preferred to the use of leisure time for group activities after that date.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

There appear to be two generalized trends emerging in the future concerning the use of leisure time for activities other than education. One trend emphasizes the individualized use of leisure time. This trend describes an appreciable to sharp increase in the use of leisure time for all individualized activities especially after 1980. The other trend, however, which concerns predominantly group activity, describes a slight to moderate increase with some levelling-off after 1980. Two minor positions influence this levelling-off aspect. These positions are characterized by a concern for the lack of desirability of inter-personal contacts involved in group activities.

The anticipated uses of leisure time follow closely the trend of anticipated values in the future. Values involving individualization will be appreciably to sharply upgraded, while group values will be only slightly upgraded. It is apparent that the individual use of leisure time will far exceed group use of leisure time in the immediate future.



Demand for recreational facilities.



Lag in the supply of recreational facilities in relation to demand.

LEGEND

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MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬

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RECREATION FACILITIES

FORECAST

There will likely be a sharp increase in demands for recreational facilities over the next 30 years. This demand will include the desire for additional indoor and outdoor recreation space, summer and winter recreation facilities, urban and multi-use facilities and wilderness areas. By 1984 it is likely that permission will be needed to enter natural recreation areas. Some types of recreation, e.g., recreation in parks and outdoor resorts and reserves will probably be permitted only on an access – time basis. Indoor and urban recreation facilities will also be in great demand. The school, however, may mediate this problem. Community schools will probably become before 1988 the "leisure centers" of the future. These leisure centers will provide the urbanite with facilities for leisure time activities of all sorts. The schools may possibly serve as "exploration institutes," where individuals might explore their own personalized interests during leisure hours. The demand for leisure time and recreation facilities within the next 35 years, however, will always exceed the potential for supply.

ALTERNATE PANEL OPINION

The extremely high demand for recreation facilities will coincide with an increase in the lag between facility supply and demand. Panelist opinion regarding this lag indicates that it will probably continue to increase at least until 1990. A minority opinion optimistically forecasts a decrease in the supply-demand lag sometime after 1980. This is based on an early recognition of the immediacy and urgency of impending recreation facility problems.



Citizen involvement in designing and determining recreational programs.



Involvement of the government in the control of recreational development.

LEGEND

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CITIZEN AND GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT

FORECAST

There will probably be a considerable increase in both citizen and government involvement in recreation in the future. Private citizens are likely to become most involved with recreation at the community level. They will more strongly influence government in its recreational considerations through their increased participation. Government control of recreational development will possibly become a necessity as the lag between supply and demand for recreational facilities increases, and as more and more people demand improved recreational facilities. Effective legislation to protect recreational lands will probably be initiated by the year 1975 and most certainly before the mid-1980's. This issue is already receiving public attention and governments are currently facing a great deal of pressure. Government response to public demand in this area will undoubtedly increase in this respect within the near future.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A major panel position in both citizen and government involvement in recreation indicates appreciable increases of activity over the next 35 years. Some minor panel positions vary the amount of increase from slight to sharp, usually differing because of some uncertainty about the nature of the relationship between government and individuals in the future. Those with minority positions supporting a definite decrease in involvement usually base their assumptions on the advance of "commercialization" in recreation or upon a general apathy which is anticipated in the public sector; one which will permeate both government and individual recreational development endeavors in the future.



Amount of coordination between governmental departments in charge of social services, education and recreation.



The decentralization of the administration for recreational services in the public sector.

LEGEND

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GOVERNMENT AND RECREATION

FORECAST

Government planning efforts, as well as government involvement in recreation activities, will probably increase appreciably in the future. This presupposes a concomitant and equal increase in coordination efforts between government departments. The calibre of leadership and professional personnel on both the city and provincial levels will most likely rise, due to more effective training and incentive programs. A greater emphasis on professional excellence in the recreation field will certainly occur. Increased specialization will probably bring about increased decentralization within government. The development of a centralized recreation service for a large urban area is already impractical. Planning and facility needs are too varied and too diverse to be handled by one central agency. Park planning and planning for areas outside municipal jurisdiction require a quite different administrative approach than does planning for spectator and participatory functions. This decentralization process probably will begin to intensify sometime in the mid-1980's. When this process has begun, it will undoubtedly gather considerable momentum.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

No division of opinion appears to exist over increased government planning efforts, increased coordination between government departments or increased acquisition and development of high-calibre personnel in the recreation field. Some diversity of opinion, however, exists over decentralization of administration within government recreation departments. Those panelists envisioning slight or moderate increase in the decentralization of governmental offices in the recreation field see this as a "reaching out into the community" and as a solution to the growing problems evident in recreation, rather than as a loss of administrative prerogative. The minority view here, especially where it indicates decrease (rather than no change) is founded upon the proposition that those already involved in the administration of recreation in government will be reluctant to relinquish their powers for a totally unproven scheme.



Conflict between commercial interests selling "fun" and public institutions attempting to promote involvement in leisure activities.



Public funds for private agencies concerned with recreation.

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RECREATION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

FORECAST

It is highly probable that leisure time will become big business in the near future. The obvious profit-potential in leisure products may prompt big business to promote the advantages of active participation in leisure time activities. "Fun parks," closed-off commercial recreation centres adjacent to large centres, will compete with wilderness areas. The "commercialization" of recreation through increased development of resort hotels, motels and natural recreation areas controlled by private concerns will probably cause conflict between big business and government. The distribution of public funds earmarked for private agencies concerned with recreation, however, will not, in all likelihood, be affected by this division between the private and public sectors of society.

Conflict between commercial and public interests will probably intensify and increase appreciably until about the mid-1990's. One minority opinion indicates that the increase will be sharper. The rationale for this position is based on a more rapid invasion of the recreation field by private concerns and a much quicker recognition of this invasion on the part of both the public and the government. A second minority opinion describes a decrease in conflict between government and commercial interests. This position is posited on the assumption that the public and private sectors of society will operate in conjunction, to solve all reacreation problems. More than likely, the public sector will allocate funds to groups within the private sector for particular tasks. Public funds may be awarded to private agencies to solve problems in the recreational field. These agencies will probably be research-oriented, rather than simply commercial outlets. Two minor positions hold that the allotment of public funds to private agencies will decrease. These forecasts are directly attributable to the anticipated conflict between the public and private sectors of society.

POLITICS

PANEL CONCLUSIONS

Our society is moving to a style of politics which is much more active and tumultuous than that of the past. Values pertaining to participation in political and community affairs will be upgraded; participation in protest groups and mass movements will increase; and, with heightened levels of participation, consensus politics will be replaced by protest politics to an increasing degree. Whether governments will be reponsive to the more militant articulation of interests and demands is questionable. Political parties may accommodate the objectives of protest groups and mass movements. But, will government itself, with its increasing bureaucratic organizations and delivery systems, be able to respond effectively?

The party system as we know it will undergo slight alterations. A one-party system will not develop, but it is likely that a two-party system will emerge as we draw near to the end of the century. The two parties in this system are likely to have distinctive ideological perspectives. This will come about as the result of increasing polarization of opinion and values.

The federalist system will undergo a redistribution of powers. The non-urban municipalities will have their powers somewhat diminished; the urban governments will have their powers greatly expanded relative to the powers of provincial governments. Is it possible that the trends between now and the year 2005 will move us towards a nation of city-states?



Community participation

Political participation

THE VALUE OF PARTICIPATION

FORECAST

Values ascribed to community participation and political participation will likely be steadily upgraded during the next 35 years. Values ascribed to political participation will be upgraded to a slightly greater degree than values ascribed to community participation.

Among the factors which may contribute to these trends are the following: the availability of increased time for participation; the development of technological devices which will facilitate participation, e.g., home computer terminals; an educational emphasis on politics and community character; increased concern about various major sets of issues, such as ecology, repression of minority groups, participatory democracy, centralization; a greater feeling for individual worth and power; and an increased awareness of rewards from participation.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

There is a great deal of agreement among panelists on the direction of trends in values pertaining to political participation; a minority of the panelists take the position that values ascribed to community participation will diminish appreciably in the years ahead. This forecast is based on the assumption that the following factors will downgrade the value of community participation: increased emphasis on the individual rather than the group; increased mobility of the Canadian public; the likelihood that leisure time will be spent on self interests rather than community interests; the development of environments, especially urban environments, in which opportunity for participation is limited; increased potential for "opting out" and alienation; and the concentration of power in the hands of political and bureaucratic elites who will govern and regulate participation.



Level of participation in local elections.



Level of participation in national elections.

LEGEND

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ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

FORECAST

The level of participation in both local and national elections will likely increase steadily in the future as values pertaining to participation are upgraded. Reasons for this trend are essentially the same as those given for the upgrading of participatory values. A great variety of groups will have more at stake in local and national elections, and their interest will, therefore, stimulate participation in such elections. Indeed, it is possible that electoral participation in the future will yield greater rewards than it does today.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A major proportion of panelists forecast no change in the level of participation in local elections and only a slight increase in the level of participation in national elections. These panelists argue that there may be an upgrading of the values pertaining to participation, and that opportunities to obtain adequate information to behave rationally in elections will be increasingly difficult to obtain, causing a degree of apathy which will counter those forces which tend to promote participation. Certain of the panelists taking this position also point out that larger segments of the Canadian population will be increasingly influenced into a state of passivity which will extend to non-participation in elections. The mass media may be the major demobilizing influence with respect to electoral participation in the future. Furthermore, the rewards from participation may be likely or are likely to come from participating in interest or pressure groups, and not from electoral participation.



Tendency toward militancy by protest groups.



Degree of accommodation to mass protests and movements by political parties.

LEGEND

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PROTEST GROUPS

FORECAST

The tendency toward militancy by protest groups in Canada is likely to increase appreciably and steadily during the next three or four decades. Those protest groups which develop into mass movements are likely to find an ever-increasing willingness in the years ahead, on the part of political parties, to accommodate their interests and objectives. For example, there is a 50% probability that by 1975 an anti-pollution movement will emerge in Canada with sufficient "political muscle" to influence governments at all levels in the direction of developing significant policies pertaining to improving environmental quality. There is a 90% chance that such a movement will have developed by 1979. Another example is the Women's Liberation Movement. By the late 1980's or early 1990's the Women's Liberation Movement will have become strong enough to move public opinion significantly in the direction of its current objectives. This movement then will likely disappear by the turn of the century.

There is a 50% chance that by 1982 there will have emerged a cohesive, well-organized extra-parliamentary opposition through an alliance between oppressed and radical groups. This movement, as it emerges in the 1970's, will not hesitate to adopt a style of confrontation politics. There is a 50% chance by the late 1970's that confrontation politics of the same order that occurrs in the United States today will become the "norm" in Canada. This style of politics will be adopted not only by the emerging alliance of oppressed and radical groups, but also by a variety of other established interest groups.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

The minority panelists take the position that the tendency towards militancy by protest groups will remain at the present level, and that political parties will be as willing or no more willing than they are now to accommodate their interests and objectives. This minority of panelists assumes that consensus politics, as we know it today, will predominate in Canada in the foreseeable future. They argue that the major issues of today, e.g., Canada-United States relations, East-West disparities, and the Anglo-French conflict, will decline in vigor, and no new issues of any significance will emerge. In consequence, politics in Canada will continue to be expressed in a low key.



Tendency towards a concentration of political power into the hands of a "technocratically-oriented" elite.



Tendency towards a diffusion of political power into an increasing number of elites, i.e., tendency towards a broader pluralist structure.

LEGEND

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PLURALISM AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

FORECAST

It is almost a certainty that Canadian political parties as we know them will continue to exist, with some modifications, but the multi-party system will give rise to a two-party system. There is a 50% probability that by the late 1980's such a system will have developed, with a more explicit left-right ideological alignment. The two parties will reflect the growing polarities in Canadian life.

There is some likelihood that during the 1970's and 1980's there will be a slight trend toward the diffusion of political power to a greater number of groups. During the 1990's, however, this tendency towards pluralism in political power may level off or even reverse itself. At the same time, there is some likelihood that during the 1990's a tendency towards a concentration of political power in the·hands of a "technocratically-oriented" elite will emerge.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A minority of panelists forecast a concentration of polikical power rather than a diffusion during the next three decades. This view is based on the assumption that governments, particularly central governments, shape the structure of power within a society, and that government itself implies a concentration of more political power. These panelists forecast an increase in centralized government in Canada.



Electoral strength of the Social Credit Party in Alberta.

LEGEND

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THE SOCIAL CREDIT PARTY IN ALBERTA

FORECAST

The electoral strength of the Social Credit Party is likely to decline steadily and sharply in the future. This forecast is based on the assumption that the Social Credit Party will be unable to change its orientation and image in directions appropriate to the changing character of Alberta society. This forecast does not imply that the Social Credit Party will be removed from the opportunity of forming the government for years to come, although, if its electoral strength declines, this will likely occur sooner or later. Despite the possibility of its fall from a position of one-party preeminence, the Social Credit Party will remain a major party in Alberta.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A minority of the panelists agree that the electoral strength of the Social Credit Party in Alberta will decline only very slightly. This minority of panelists argues that the Social Credit Party will become a party of change, inclined towards the political center, or perhaps toward the moderate left. This minority believes that the Social Credit government in the future, especially in the 1970's, will be a government of reform and innovation, even though these characteristics will develop on a fairly moderate scale.



Electoral strength of the Progressive Conservative Party in Alberta.



Strength of the Progressive Conservative Party at the Federal level.

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THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

FORECAST

The strength of the Progressive Conservative Party at the federal level is likely to change only slightly, if it changes at all. The electoral strength of this party in Alberta is likely to increase sharply in the 1970's and remain fairly stable thereafter. It is likely that the Progressive Conservative Party in Alberta will become more "right-wing" in its orientation in order to accommodate the urban middle-class. This forecast is based on the assumption that the urban middle-class will become sufficiently large enough in Alberta to enhance the strength of the Progressive Conservative Party as it orients itself towards the "right". Furthermore, it is likely that Alberta will, in general, move towards greater support of parties which have federal strength. If this occurs, then the Progressive Conservative Party in Alberta may have some advantage over the Social Credit Party in the years ahead.

The prospects of the Progressive Conservative Party at the federal level are rather dim. If its current strength remains unchanged, this party will not be in a position to form a government between now and the turn of the century. Although there is a high probability that the Progressive Conservative Party will not, in the foreseeable future, make great gains in urban areas, it will not become an entirely rural-based party.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A minority of the panelists forecast that the Progressive Conservative Party at the federal level will have its strength diminished steadily during the next three decades. These panelists argue that Canada will have a modified two-party system in which the Liberal Party will be the true "conservative party" and the New Democratic Party will form the "liberal" or left-wing party.

Panelists are in general, in agreement that the electoral strength of the Progressive Conservative Party in Alberta will increase; they are in disagreement however, on how much it will increase during the next several decades. A minority of panelists forecast an extremely sharp increase in electoral strength for this party; another minority of panelists forecast only a slight increase in that strength. The major difference between these two minority positions pertains to the ability of the party to mobilize its talent and its youth into the ranks, and the relative ability or inability of the Social Credit Party to re-orient itself in accordance with the broader social changes occurring in Alberta.



Electoral strength of the N.D.P. in Alberta.



Strength of the N.D.P. at the Federal level.

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THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY

FORECAST

The strength of the New Democratic Party at the federal level, and also at the provincial level, will likely increase only very slightly during the 1980's and 1990's. It is likely that there will be a somewhat greater increase in strength at the federal level than at the provincial level. This forecast is based on the assumption that the New Democratic Party will benefit from the conditions of rapid social change in Canadian society, and that it will also benefit from the general ideological direction it fosters, away from the system of capitalism as we now know it.

The factors which are thought to contribute towards a strengthening of the New Democratic Party are the following: a basic shift in Canadian values towards some form of socialism; increased urbanization and accompanying changes in occupational structure; and the increased radicalization of Canadian society.

ALTERNATIVE PANEL POSITIONS

A substantial proportion of the panelists forecast an appreciable increase in the strength of the New Democratic Party at the federal level after 1980. It is possible for the NDP to have its strength increased appreciably after 1980 if, as these panelists argue, it can capture the major thrusts of transition within Canadian society during the next twenty years. This view obtains also for a minority of panelists who forecast an appreciable increase in the electoral strength of this party in Alberta during the next thirty years.

Another minority of the panelists forecast no appreciable change in the electoral strength of the New Democratic Party in Alberta. This view is based on the assumption that urbanization in Alberta has its own peculiar forms which selectively attract people who will not support this party. Furthermore, this minority does not accept as its premise the future failure of private enterprise, a factor frequently considered an aid to the ascent of the New Democratic Party.



Electoral strength of the Liberal Party.



Strength of the Liberal Party at the Federal level.

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THE LIBERAL PARTY

FORECAST

The strength of the Liberal Party at the federal level is likely to decline only slightly in the coming years. In Alberta, its electoral strength also will remain essentially unchanged. It is likely that the Social Credit Party will, in the future, occupy the ideological ground previously occupied by the Liberal Party. As a consequence, there may be a federal-provincial trade-off between the Liberal Party in Alberta and the Social Credit Party, i.e., a *quid pro quo* for mutual electoral support.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A minority of the panelists forecast a significant increase in the electoral strength of the Liberal Party in Alberta during the 1980's and the 1990's. The suggestion is that it will take the Liberal Party in Alberta at least one decade to organize itself and develop the required internal solidarity and resources needed for it to become a viable political party during the last two decades of this century.



Powers of provincial governments, relative to those of the Government of Canada.



Powers of non-urban municipalities, relative to provincial governments.

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FEDERALISM

FORECAST

Provincial governments will not likely lose any appreciable powers relative to those of the Government of Canada. The powers of large urban governments relative to that of provincial governments, however, will likely increase and grow appreciably. The powers of non-urban municipalities, relative to those of provincial governments, on the other hand, will diminish appreciably and steadily during the next three decades.

The powers of the large cities will increase, largely because of increased population concentration and the complexity and uniqueness of many urban problems with which central governments do not have the resources to deal. It is likely that the federal government will deal directly with city governments in the future, especially in such areas as health, welfare, and housing. It may be that Canada will in the future consist of a series of city-states. Should this occur, the provinces will probably lose a great many of their current powers.

The powers of non-urban municipalities will decrease for a variety of reasons. These areas will continue to depopulate. Also, it is unlikely that non-urban areas will have sufficient resources to maintain acceptable levels of service. They will likely experience a decline in quality of leadership at the local level.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

In general, most panelists agree on the forecasts stated above. One minority position, however, is worth noting. This minority forecasts an increase in the powers of provincial governments relative to the powers of the Government of Canada. It is persuaded that the economic strength of the provinces, as well as the leadership talents which provincial governments will be able to mobilize, will be factors which off-set trends towards increased centralization.



Growth of central government bureaucracy in Alberta.



Decentralization of government structures and programs in Alberta.

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GOVERNMENTAL BUREAUCRACY

FORECAST

Very slight growth in the Alberta provincial government's administrative departments is forecasted. At the same time, it is likely that there will be a slight but somewhat steady decentralization of government structures and programs during the next several decades. This constraint on bureaucratic growth in Alberta, and an effort towards decentralization of government, will provide the general strategies of the provincial government in response to the upgrading of Albertans' values pertaining to community or local determination and participation. Urbanization and its effects in Alberta will provide an opportunity for the provincial government to constrain its bureaucratic growth. Conscious efforts to strengthen non-urban municipalities through intergovernmental cooperation will provide the means for the gradual decentralization of both government structures and programs. This does not imply that there will be no intensification of effort toward centralized planning. The forecast simply indicates the directions which planning could take in the development of programs and policies which will have a slightly increased emphasis on the decentralization of administration and delivery.

ALTERNATIVE PANEL POSITIONS

Once again, there is fairly general agreement among the panelists on these forecasts. However, a minority of the panelists forecasts an appreciable and steady increase in the growth of central governmental bureaucracy in Alberta. This minority forecast is based on the assumption that increased government education on pollution in the province, increased central planning, the development of greater controls on private enterprise, and the assumption of greater responsibilities from non-urban local governments will necessitate the continued growth of central governmental agencies.

NATIVE PEOPLES

PANEL CONCLUSIONS

To achieve equality in all its dimensions, the Native people will, in all likelihood, be forced to assimilate in one fashion or another into white society. Will this impending integration be achieved within the Native people's frame of reference, or within the frame of reference of dominant society? While cultural genocide is not necessarily a stated prerequisite for the ascendancy of cultural groups within Canadian society, many Native people feel that they must suffer a disproportionate amount of cultural loss in order to achieve Canadian status. The Red-White conflicts which are forecasted for the 1970's and 1980's indicate the Native people's tenacity to "hold on" to that which they consider rightfully their own. Becoming "Canadian" means nothing if the assimilating group's contribution to Canadian society is not recognized and appreciated by other Canadians. Future intercultural friction should be regarded as arbitration and not confrontation by white Canadian society.

It appears that many of the Native people's present-day demands probably will be met in the distant future. But, what about future demands emanating from future needs and future requirements? Is, in fact, a ten- or twenty-year span acceptable, or even respectable, in terms of meeting present-day demands? The Native people will likely have a long and hard struggle to achieve the same rights, privileges and benefits which most other Canadians enjoy today. In the 1990's, when the Native people have achieved today's level of equality and equanimity, will they then be equal with the other members of Canadian society? The forecast data seems to indicate that they will probably not be equal with others. The Native people will have gained much by the year 2005, but they will in turn have lost much in terms of their own culture. Even with this gain there will probably be large and easily recognizable differences in status between the Native peoples and other cultural groups in Canada.



Rate of assimilation of Native people into white society.



Resurgence of "traditionalism", that is, "back to Indian ways", among Native people in Alberta.

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ASSIMILATION

FORECAST

A slight to an appreciable increase in the rate of assimilation of Native people into white society will continue steadily over the next 35 years. This increase will be accompanied by a sharp increase in the resurgence of "traditionalism" among Native people in Alberta until about 1990. After this time the trend toward traditionalism will begin to level off. Native cultural ties will begin to lessen as Native people begin to suffer language loss and lose the present-day value orientations of their enforced poverty status. It is likely that Native people will cease to view assimilation with a defeatist outlook and will adapt to white society and its value system after their goals in education, political and legal equality, job equality and better housing are obtained. Their success in all these areas is forecasted between 1980 and 1990, but not without a very difficult struggle. Intergroup marriage will also probably increase during this decade. Only these accomplishments will successfully eliminate prejudice and discrimination against Native people. An escape from the feeling of overbearing poverty can only be accomplished through an increased reawakening of cultural pride and ethnic identification forecasted for the 1970's and 1980's.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

There appears to be no disagreement on the rate or direction of increase towards the assimilation of Native peoples into white society. The only panel differences are differences in the intensity of this trend. These differences are predicated mainly upon the ability of Native people to achieve equality in the various sectors of Canadian social life. Some divergence of opinion exists, however, on the resurgence of traditionalism among Native people. A minority of the panelists argue that no renaissance in Native culture will occur. This minority predicates its judgment mainly on the assumption that the only path to assimilation is through the immediate shedding of cultural ties. This notion contradicts the forecasted trend for achievement and attainment through cultural pride.



Size of Native people's families.



The degree of acceptance by Indian and Metis people of the white middle class family as a model for family life.

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THE NATIVE FAMILY

FORECAST

There is considerable evidence that a dramatic change in the structure and organization of the Native family will occur in the next 35 years. A stabilization in family size, fostered by a levelling-off and perhaps even a decline in the birth rate and overall population growth, is anticipated. This decline will probably begin in the late 1980's. Similarly, there is strong agreement that an increase will occur in the degree of acceptance of a white middle class standard of family life by Indian and Metis people during this period. Both forecasts are directly related to the ascendancy of assimilative processes which are anticipated during the 1980's. The Native people's thrust towards a return to communal life will disappear when the cultural revitalization movements of the 1970's and 1980's wane. The Native family will likely be an urban family by 1990. It will, however, still be characterized by single-parent status, compound families of relatives, also semi-permanent residence, and ghettoization. The assimilation of upwardly mobile Native people into the white middle class will be slow but constant.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

Considerable disagreement regarding family size exists among the panelists. Those panelists who envision no change or an increase in Native family size generally feel that the stigma of lower class status among Native people will prevail. This minority sees no solution to the over-population problem among Native people coming from social or governmental birth control programs or welfare programs. This opinion differs from that of the majority, who place a great emphasis on the power of the assimilative process. Nearly all panelists agree completely that Native people will eventually accept the model of the white middle class family as a way of life. Once again, only the intensity of this trend is an issue here.



The return to Native religions by Native people.



The development of a Native literature.

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NATIVE CULTURE

FORECAST

In all likelihood Native literature and Native language will experience a great revival during the 1980's concomitant to an increase in the return of traditionalism among Native peoples. This trend will probably level off after 1990. Language loss, however, will be experienced by a majority of the present-day speakers. The Native languages of Alberta will never completely disappear – at least not until after 2005. The development of a Native education center and the desirability and awareness of "Indianness" among Native youth will be responsible for the continued preservation of these trends. A trend toward a return of Native religions will also increase, but increase in this area will probably be much more steady and gradual. This trend may in some ways be related to the general development of "personalized" religions among the society as a whole during this period.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

There is some evidence expressed in minority opinion that these alterations in Native culture will be greater in scale and scope than that which is allowed for by the majority panel opinion. These differences are in general founded upon notions of the current renaissance of Native culture. If such a cultural revival can maintain its potential past the 1980's, then, perhaps, the minority estimates are more realistic than those of the majority of panelists.



Educational opportunities for Native people.



The value ascribed by Native people to higher levels of education.

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EDUCATION AND NATIVE PEOPLES

FORECAST

It is likely that there will be a continued and appreciable increase in emphasis placed upon the value of education by Native peoples within the next 35 years. A closely corresponding increase in educational opportunity available to Native people will probably develop, and, during the 1980's, the opportunity will slightly exceed educational demand. Some time in the 1980's, the church school and residential school concepts will be abandoned and the teaching of Native languages and courses with Native content will be adopted. A trend toward significant Native content in the school curriculum will also increase appreciably and steadily for the next 35 years. Native peoples will eventually be given control over their own educational system. This will in all likelihood occur by about 1978. It will definitely occur by the 1980's. Provincial rather than federal jurisdiction over the education of Native children, and a provincial school program devised to emphasize that Native people "can get along" in an urban environment, will probably be realized by the late 1980's. A majority of Native teachers teaching in predominantly Native elementary schools will not be a feasible alternative before the year 2000. An attempt to make Native languages the language of instruction in predominantly Native schools, however, will probably never be realized.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

Most panelists feel that educational opportunities for Native people and the desire of Native people to acquire an education will both increase rapidly. A minority position, however, indicates that this trend will begin to level off after about 1990. This opinion is based on the assumption that supply and demand will both diminish as the Native people tend toward assimilation or as their requirements for education are adjusted to meet those of the white society. Another minority position sees the Native people as not ascribing to achieve higher levels of eduation. This view fosters the supporting opinion that Native people cannot or will not readily assimilate into white society.



Employment opportunities for Native people.



Competitiveness as an aspect of Native culture.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ________

MAJOR — — — — —

MINOR – – – – –

MODAL ━━━━━━

NATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

FORECAST

It is likely that employment opportunities for Native people can be expected to increase at a moderate rate until the mid-1980's and then at a rapid rate until the turn of the century. As a result, competitiveness will increase as an aspect of the Native culture, though the increase will be more gradual than that felt in employment opportunities. Some slight increase can likely be anticipated in the development of major industries on reserves and Metis colonies. A similar slight increase can be observed in the awarding of monetary compensation for Native people who lose their traditional means of livelihood through ecological disaster and industrial exploitation. The reserves and colonies, however, will likely remain "pockets of poverty" until about the year 2000 or thereafter. These containment areas are not likely to become self-sufficient until some time after 2005. There is some possibility that they may attract substantial tourist industry after 1980. This, however, will not be sufficient for their independent economic well-being. Employment opportunities for Native people will in all likelihood exist primarily in the urban areas, and hunting and fishing as a subsistence base will diminish and probably disappear between 1980 and the year 2000. Social welfare programs for Native people will probably still be necessary, at least until the turn of the century.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

Very little difference of opinion stems from the economic forecasts. Where difference does occur, however, it is once again predicated upon the rate of change and the willingness of Native people to assimilate within the next thirty years. There is usually an obverse relationship in the opinions of panelists with respect to the trends dealing with employment opportunities and the amount of competitiveness expected among Native peoples.



Rate of Native migration to urban centers.



Migration back to reserves.

LEGEND

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MAJOR ━ ━ ━ ━
MINOR — — — —
MODAL ━━━━

URBANIZATION OF NATIVE PEOPLES

FORECAST

The current trend toward an increased rate of Native migration to urban centers will certainly continue over the next 35 years. It will in all likelihood, however, intensify appreciably to sharply, especially after 1980. In conjunction with this urban migration trend, it is also likely that migration back to the reserves will diminish somewhat. Native people, therefore, will more and more become urban people within the next three decades. Free access to urban facilities (i.e., housing, schools, hotels, recreational areas, etc.) for Native people, on an equal basis with urban whites, will probably not be achieved much before 1990 at the very earliest. This forecast foreshadows a trend toward the development of Native-centered urban ghettoes, which will likely continue to grow until the turn of the century. Only a politically active Native population can prevent this situation from occurring.

PANEL OPINION

Panel divergence of opinion concerning the direction of Native migration appears to be minimal. Consensus favors the occurrence of strong urban movements, especially after 1980. Divergence related to migration back to the reserve areas, however, varies in accordance with anticipated conditions on the reserve. A minority of panelists indicate that practically no back-migration will occur after 1980 due to lack of employment and technological conveniences, and general dissatisfaction with the Native way of life in favor of urban life-styles. Differences in the increase of the rate of urban migration accounted for by panelists can be gauged upon the same reasons.



The political influence of Native people in government.



Governmental controls of Native people's cultural, educational and economic development.

LEGEND

MAJORITY
MAJOR
MINOR
MODAL

NATIVE GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS

FORECAST

The political influence of Native people on government will quite likely increase appreciably to sharply especially after 1980. At the same time, governmental control over Native cultural, educational and economic development will probably decrease. These trends may develop from a sharp increase in militance among Native peoples during the 1970's and 1980's (especially among the Native youth) in an effort to guarantee their rights and freedoms. Native people will probably never voluntarily relinquish their treaty rights. They will also never accept an ombudsman to adjudicate the inequities imposed upon them. Their leaders will more than likely never become complacent about Native goals and aims – at least not until most of these demands are satisfied. Because of a strong resistance to the relinquishment of treaty rights we will probably never see the abolition of distinctions between treaty, non-treaty and Metis Native peoples nor the taxation of Native peoples. The advent of a Pan-Indian movement by the late 1970's will help to institute Native control over their own social welfare programs or help to provide welfare benefits and privileges comparable to those received by whites. Programs like these are likely to be effective by 1980. Block-voting and organized alliances with white interest groups will help to make the Native voice heard after 1980.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

The panel opinion on this forecast was greatly polarized. Both a major position and a majority position are well defined. The forecasted position above most closely resembles that of the majority or perhaps the modal position. The major position, however, indicates similar trending but to a much lesser degree. Major position panelists are less inclined to agree with the strong ascendancy of militance among Native peoples, and they also question some of the forecasted events.



Equality before the law for Native people.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————
MAJOR — — — —
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MODAL ━━━━

NATIVE PEOPLE AND THE LAW

FORECAST

Equality before the law for Native people will probably increase, but not until some time after 1980. Native people are becoming and will become increasingly aware of their legal rights. This trend will probably continue to increase at a sharp or appreciable rate as Native people become more and more urbanized and assimilated into white middle class society. Legal equality, however, cannot be obtained without the awareness and help of members of white society. Legal equality presupposes economic and educational equality as well as a firm knowledge of the law. The rate of crime and excessive drinking will also likely diminish but not as a direct result of the assimilative process or of the attainment of legal equality by Native peoples. This trend will come about more as a by-product of these factors. Crime and excessive drinking among Native people will only diminish when they are afforded the same "human dignity" sometimes taken for granted as "given" by all other Canadians.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A rather pessimistic panel minority position indicates that almost no change in status concerning Native equality before the law is apparent in the immediate future. While no reasons were presented for this position, the position undoubtedly assumes that no assimilation will take place in the immediate future. It also assumes that the Native people will have no viable political instruments to obtain equality, that they will not achieve independence, that they will not have geographic or social mobility. In fact, it assumes that Canadian law and law-makers will have very little to say on behalf of the Native people. A second minority position suggests a completely opposite stance. This position forecasts an extremely sharp rise in the trend towards equality before the law for Native people. The only reason presented here for this forecast is the readiness of white society to comply with Native demands in the face of Native militant action.

RELATIONS WITH OTHERS

PANEL CONCLUSIONS

The nature of interpersonal relationships is fundamental to well-being. Will the quality of these relationships improve in the future? Will they change in somewhat the same way as they did in the transition from a rural into a predominantly urban society?

There will likely be both improvement, at least by current standards of evaluation, and degeneration in interpersonal relationships. There will be somewhat greater tolerance for deviant behavior as codes of norms pertaining to interpersonal relationships are relaxed. The values ascribed to service, generosity, charity, and sincerity in relationships with others will be appreciably upgraded. Efforts to "help one's neighbor" will become somewhat more prevalent. However, it is likely that loneliness and social isolation will increase.

The implication of previous forecasts concerning institutional and political change would lead to another conclusions: interpersonal relationships will become somewhat more symmetrical and somewhat less hierarchical in the future. Whatever forms of interpersonal interaction develop will have an important bearing on many of the social problems forecasted in later sections.



Relaxation of codes of norms pertaining to interpersonal relationships.



Tolerance of deviant behavior.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———

MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬

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TOLERANCE AND INTERPERSONAL NORMS

FORECAST

There will likely be an appreciable relaxation of codes of norms pertaining to interpersonal relationships in the future; there will also be a slight increase in the degree of tolerance of deviant behavior. In a society where values ascribed to freedom of choice and individual expression are upgraded, where variety in styles and structures of the basic units of socialization such as the family are increased, it is highly likely that conformity in behavior and physical appearance will be downgraded. Additional factors which will contribute to the relaxation of norms in interpersonal relationships and increased tolerance are a reaction against depersonalization in the society, decreasing emphasis upon community mores as the basis for socialization, and increased emphasis in education on individualism and "doing your own thing."

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A minority of panelists forecast a decrease in tolerance of deviant behavior in the years ahead. These same panelists, for the most part, forecast a trend towards "tightening up" codes of norms pertaining to interpersonal relationships after 1980. The major considerations indicated for this position are increased necessity of conformity in group situations (which will become more prevelent); increasing conservatism as a reaction to social change; diminished opportunity in the employment market, giving employers the option of intolerance for deviant behavior and physical appearance in the selection of employees; and a heightened feeling of uncertainty about the validity of social freedom.



Loneliness and social isolation.



Individual's needs for social distance.

LEGEND

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MODAL ━━━━

SOCIAL DISTANCE AND LONELINESS

FORECAST

The extent of loneliness and social isolation on the one hand, and the need for social distance on the other, will likely increase somewhat during the next three decades. The individual's needs for social distance are partly biological and partly culturally defined. Traditional patterns for establishing distance limits, i.e., principles of order and structure, will likely undergo modification and alteration in the future. Thus, social distance will be somewhat more difficult to achieve. Loneliness and social isolation seem, already, to be affecting increasing numbers of people. This trend will continue as a result of increased geographical mobility, greater populations in the cities, heightened levels of fear and the breakdown of trust relationships.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A minority of panelists forecast a decline in the individual's need for social distance. This position is predicated on the view that population growth and concentration will necessitate a reconditioning, such that needs for social distance and personal space will be greatly reduced.

A minority of panelists believe that loneliness and social isolation will decline in the years ahead. With increased value ascribed to participation of various kinds, a relaxation in norms governing interpersonal relationships; and increased emphasis on individuality and expression, conditions which now contribute to loneliness and social isolation, will gradually be removed.



Efforts to help one's neighbour.



Service (generosity, charity, sincerity).

LEGEND

MAJORITY ——————

MAJOR — — — —

MINOR - - - - -

MODAL ━━━━━━

SERVICE TO OTHERS

FORECAST

Values ascribed to service, generosity, charity and sincerity in relating to others will probably be upgraded appreciably in the coming years. Also, it seems likely that efforts to "help one's neighbor" will become somewhat more prevalent in our society. Altruism has already been fairly widely accepted as a norm among young people. Other factors in this trend may include increasing leisure time, providing the opportunity for the exercise of altruism; the emphasis by governments on service to others more than in the past; and a de-emphasis of profit, with the realization that values ascribed to service are a necessity for moral well-being.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A minority of panelists forecast no change, or virtually no change, in values ascribed to service. A minority of panelists also forecast a decrease in efforts to "help one's neighbor". These positions are based on the following assumptions: that there will be increasing emphasis on selfish values such as well-being, security, convenience and leisure; that advertising and mass entertainment images will sponsor self-indulgence, as opposed to service; that our society will move towards increased depersonalization and thus increased cruelty and aggression rather than service and charity; and that there will be inadequate degree of change in our basic economic-political structure to facilitate the upgrading of service values.

LAW AND DISORDER

PANEL CONCLUSIONS

The need for law and order will increase sharply over the next two decades. However, the increase of "enforced law" will more than likely bring an increase of social disorder. Increased crime, including juvenile delinquency and massive social unrest, will develop and grow at least until the 1990's. Lack of respect or disrespect for justice will accompany this disorder. As our legal institutions press harder to eliminate the actions of those who stand up against society, they will compound the problems and intensify the conflict. Law and order must become more than catchwords, and justice become justice for all, before we realize the stabilized society that could possibly develop before the turn of the century.



Law and order



Extent of nonviolence in our society.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————
MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬
MINOR — — — —
MODAL ▬▬▬▬

LAW, ORDER AND NONVIOLENCE

FORECAST

Law and order values will likely be somewhat upgraded during the 1970's; during the 1980's and 1990's, these values will likely be downgraded. On the other hand, the extent of nonviolence in our society will decrease appreciably during the next decade, a trend which will be reversed by the 1990's. There is a reverse relationship between the changes in law and order values, and the extent of nonviolence. Law and order values will be upgraded during the next decade for the following reasons: there will be a "backlash" effect to the permissive society of the last two decades; there will be a reaction against ideological minorities such as radical students; public educational facilities such as the mass media will increasingly emphasize law and order values. These values will be downgraded after 1980 in reaction to instances of oppression and the curtailment of rights; the continued spread of crime; the widening of the gap between achievement and expectation particularly with respect to socio-economic disparities, which will result in social disorders; and the return to increased permissiveness in the social order.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

There is a fairly wide range of opinions on these two forecast items among panelists. The item pertaining to law and order divides the panel in accordance with the reasons underlying upgrading and downgrading given above. Namely, the minority which forecasts a steady and appreciable upgrading of law and order values emphasizes the factors given in the forecast for upgrading in the 1970's; the minority of panelists which forecasts a steady and appreciable downgrading of law and order values emphasizes reasons for downgrading given in the forecast.

On the item pertaining to the extent of nonviolence in our society, the forecast given above has several variations. The reasoning underlying these variations is not different; the intuitive guesses with respect to probabilities are somewhat distinguishable. However, a major percentage of the panelists forecasted a steady increase in the extent of nonviolence. This group assumed one of two major positions: (1) that Canadian society would move increasingly towards a totalitarian super state in which law enforcement methods would reduce violence; and (2) that Canadian society would undergo a fundamental transformation in which values pertaining to nonviolence would be effectively transmitted.



Massive social unrest and instability of near-revolutionary proportions.

LEGEND

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SOCIAL UNREST

FORECAST

The potential for massive social unrest and instability of near-revolutionary proportions will increase appreciably and steadily during the next two decades. This potential will level off or perhaps even decline during the 1990's. The major divisions in the Canadian society will, as has been indicated earlier, be widened considerably during the decades ahead. Fundamental institutional changes will create new conditions which will breed not only insecurity and fear, but will also lead to various forms of political extremism. Certain forms of extremist expression, e.g., urban guerilla warfare, are gradually becoming models for the leaders of radical groups in Canada.

These are some of the conditions which might trigger social unrest of massive proportions.

PANEL POSITIONS

There is a considerable amount of agreement among panelists on this forecast. Some difference of opinion between the major and minor positions exists on the degree to which the following variables will affect the potential for massive social unrest: a younger population with little investment in things as they are now; the degree to which a coalition between the underprivileged and radical groups will occur; the extent of oppressive law enforcement measures and the extent of the reaction to them; the degree of economic dislocation and change.



Crime rates.



Rates of juvenile delinquency.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————

MAJOR — — — —

MINOR - - - - - - -

MODAL ━━━━

CRIME

FORECAST

Crime rates, including rates of juvenile delinquency as it is currently understood, will increase appreciably during the next two decades. In the 1990's these trends will have been stemmed. Crimes committed for non-economic gain, in particular, will increase rapidly until 1990.

Factors contributing to these trends include: increasing rates of unemployment; the weakening of current institutions providing for the socialization of the young, such as the school; increased agressiveness in relationships between people; and an inability of law enforcement agencies to adapt to rapid urbanization. It should be noted that in all likelihood "crime" will be redefined in the future, mainly as a reaction to its increase. Cities and local municipalities can expect to allocate proportionately larger amounts of their fiscal resources to fighting crime and to law enforcement. In fact, it is conceivable that in urban areas the size of police forces will increase at a rate much higher than the population growth of those areas.

PANEL POSITIONS

There is a high degree of agreement among panelists on the direction of trends in crime rates and rates of juvenile delinquency. A minority of panelists forecast virtually no change in the crime and delinquency rates. The assumption in this position is that programs now designed to eliminate the social causes of crime will in the future be relatively effective even in the face of large scale socio-economic change. Almost all panelists share the opinion that solutions to the problems of eliminating or at least controlling the root causes of crime can be found, if not within the next decade or two, at least by the 1990's.



Hesitancy to seek redress through established formal channels.



Respect for justice through the law.

LEGEND

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MAJOR ━ ━ ━
MINOR – – – –
MODAL ━━━

JUSTICE

FORECAST

Respect for justice through the law will decline or diminish considerably in the years ahead. As this trend develops, a hesitancy to seek redress through established and formal channels will increase. There will be a tendency in the future towards "overcriminalization", i.e., the extensive use of criminal sanctions in lieu of other forms of social control. Overcriminalization will tend to delay court proceedings, which will in turn defer the effective dispensing of justice. The straining of court resources will encourage contempt for justice. Further contempt and disrespect may develop in reaction to ineffectual law enforcement agencies. These agencies may not rise sufficiently to the challenge of expanded social tasks, a rising crime rate, and conduct proscriptions in the interest of civil rights.

The ineffectiveness of these agencies, compounded by the increasing difficulty and cost of seeking redress, will make Canadians much more hesitant to use existing appeals systems. However, changes in institutional approaches to people, i.e., the humanization of institutions, will bring about a decline in such hesitancy_especially in the more distant future.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A minority of panelists forecast no change in the degree of respect for justice through the law. These same panelists tend to forecast a slight upgrading in values pertaining to law and order. They argue that courts and law enforcement agencies will adjust effectively to new and changing conditions.

Those who forecast an actual decline in the hesitancy to seek redress are optimistic about the increased sensitivity of both the courts and institutions to victims, and those who have been dealt with unjustly. These panelists point to revisions in appeal systems operative in large bureaucracies and organizations as well as to recent attempts to "modernize" the courts.

MENTAL ILLNESS AND OTHER SOCIAL PROBLEMS

PANEL CONCLUSIONS

A great variety of future problems have already been identified in this report. An increasing number of individuals will find it difficult to cope with rapid social change. As a consequence, alienation will become more prevalent and with it the rates of mental illness will increase. In addition to those listed earlier, problems attending drug-use, alcoholism, suicide, mass media manipulation of behavior and opinion, and the acquisition of reliable information will become increasingly severe as we draw near to the end of this century. While the first three — drug-use, alcoholism, and suicide — may have, basically, common roots in a transitional society, the problems connected with acquiring reliable information on which to base rational action stems from quite different conditions. The former set of problems become more salient under conditions of affluence and societal dislocation, the latter appears to arise primarily from complexity of the social order in which one must act. Reliable information is costly; the control of the mass media for the manipulation of public opinion and behavior, a use to which these media will be put increasingly in the future, makes reliable information even costlier. Our society will likely not be apathetic about the problems and needs of the individual. An increased proportion of resources — time and money — will be devoted to dealing with these problems.



Prevalence of alienated individuals.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————

MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬

MINOR – – – –

MODAL ━━━━

ALIENATION

FORECAST

The prevalence of alienated individuals will likely increase, particularly during the next decade. This trend will probably level off by 1990. The inability of individuals to develop and pursue goals which they consider worthwhile in an increasingly complex social order will contribute to more intensive and pervasive forms of alienation. The weakening of family structure, society's gradualism in dealing with problems of population control, technological change, governmental bureaucracy, pollution, leisure time, injustice and income redistribution, and increased difficulties in comprehending social and technological change are important factors in this trend. New and important opportunities for participation in the ordering of change processes as well as the restabilization of social institutions, and, along with this process, the clarification and learning of appropriate values and expectations, will stem alienation by the last decade of this century.

ALTERNATE PANEL OPINION

Two minority positions which deviate from this forecast are as follows: (1) there will be no change in the prevalence of alienated individuals during the next three decades; (2) there will be a sharp and steady decrease of alienation in our society during the forecast period. The major argument for the latter of these two positions is that factors now contributing to alienation will have their effects offset and nullified by new opportunities for more direct and significant participation in social change processes. The "active society" will diminish the extent of alienation and normlessness. The former position assumes a cancelling out of the alienation effects of the relevant societal trends and forces.



Prevalence of depression and feelings of insecurity.



Incidence of mental illness per 1,000 population.

LEGEND
MAJORITY ————
MAJOR — — — —
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MODAL ━━━━

MENTAL ILLNESS

FORECAST

The prevalence of depression and the incidence of mental illness will likely increase appreciably and steadily during the coming 35 years. Increased emotional stress resulting from overcrowded living and working environments will increase the incidence of neurosis and other mental illnesses. Over-population, urban crowding, and increased high-rise apartment living will encroach upon the individual's need for social distance. Major problems, moreover, will be caused by rapid social change. Personal values will not have stable social support. Inability to adapt to change will be one of the most common factors causing mental illness.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

The majority of panelists agree with the forecast above. A minority forecast shows no noticeable change in either the prevalence of depression and feelings of insecurity, or in the incidence of mental illness. The minority position is based on the premise that response to the possibility of increased mental illness will be effective in terms of both an increased expenditure of funds to cope with the problems of mental health and the development of more adequate and effective means for the prevention of mental illness.



Realization by citizens of the value of mental health to community well-being.



Per capita expenditures for mental health services.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———
MAJOR – – – –
MINOR - - - - - -
MODAL ━━━

THE VALUE OF MENTAL HEALTH

FORECAST

The values ascribed to mental health and its benefits to the community will be appreciably upgraded in the future. There will be, as a result, a proportionately greater increase in funds spent on research and treatment for mental rather than physical health. Research in the fields of physiological psychology and chemotherapy will receive an exceptional amount of support. Community mental and emotional health centers will become common, offering out-patient services and "crisis intervention" treatment.

Society will no longer look upon a person's desire for psychological counciling or psychotherapy as a sign of weakness or lack of will power. It will likely be looked upon as an indication of strength in attempting to resolve personal problems. More money and facilities will be provided for mental health because mental health problems will be so widespread in our society.

ALTERNATIVE PANEL POSITIONS

There is general agreement among the panelists that per capita expenditures for mental health services will increase. There is some disagreement as to how rapidly these expenditures will be increased. A minority of panelists forecast an extremely sharp increase until about 1990, at which time there may be a leveling off in expenditures for these services. The majority of panelists, however, see only a slight but steady increase between now and the year 2005.

There is somewhat more disagreement on the panel on the question as to whether the value of mental health will be realized more than it is today. One major position taken is that it will be sharply upgraded; another major position is that it will be only slightly downgraded. The latter position assumes the development of effective means for the prevention of mental illness i.e., an adequate supply of mental health services. If scarcity or inadequacy in services is necessary to the upgrading of the value of mental health, then this position may be credible.



Incidence of dependence on mood-altering drugs.



Incidence of alcoholism.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———

MAJOR — — —

MINOR – – –

MODAL ━━━

DRUG USE AND ALCOHOLISM

FORECAST

Drug use is likely to increase sharply for the next two decades, but after 1990 this trend will level off. The rate of alcoholism will also increase appreciably and steadily during the next three decades. These trends in dependence on mood-altering drugs and alcohol are based on the assumption that large segments of the population will be unable to cope with the rapidity and scale of technological and social change. Also, large segments of the population will become dissatisfied with future directions of social change, causing intensified frustration and greater use of the various mechanisms for escape.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITIONS

A major percentage of panelists forecasted a decline in the rate of alcoholism especially after 1980. A minority took the position that the incidence of dependence upon mood-altering drugs would decline very slightly but steadily in the future. Among the reasons given for these positions are the following: increased volume of research showing the negative consequences of alcohol and drugs for the human body, increased awareness of this research and of the social consequences of dependence, and changes in values pertaining to the use of drugs and alcohol. A decline in the rate of dependence on alcohol may be related to the trend for dependence on mood-altering drugs.



The suicide rate.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ————

MAJOR ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬

MINOR – – – – – –

MODAL ━━━━

SUICIDE

FORECAST

The rate of suicide is likely to increase appreciably during the 1970's and 1980's; thereafter, it will likely remain stable or decline. The increase in affluence, the inability to cope with change, the lack of success of programs designed to motivate individuals to participate, and the ineffectiveness of future mental health programs, are the major variables which were identified as contributing to the direction of this trend. If effective participation and successful mental health programs are not instituted, the suicide rate may very well increase appreciably. The goal of "humanization" which is emerging in various institutions, such as the school, may be considered a response to those problems which lead to suicide.

PANEL OPINION

The panel is essentially agreed on this forecast. There is a slight disagreement on how rapidly the suicide rate will increase during the next two decades and whether it will level off at that time or decline.



Manipulation of opinion and behavior by the mass media.



Problem of obtaining reliable information.

LEGEND

MAJORITY ———
MAJOR — — — —
MINOR - - - - - -
MODAL ━━━

INFORMATION AND THE MEDIA

FORECAST

It will quite likely be increasingly difficult to obtain the reliable information necessary for rational action during the next 35 years. Increasingly, it will be possible, therefore, for the mass media to manipulate opinion and behavior. The major reason indicated for the difficulty of obtaining reliable information is the increasing cost and the high level of skill necessary to obtain it. Despite governmental efforts to make information more reliable and more easily available, their programs will probably be inadequate in relation to the problem. Also, governments at all levels may, in the future, intensify their efforts to control information in order to make it difficult to obtain. Such control is likely to be selective.

ALTERNATE PANEL POSITION

A minority of panelists forecast that the problem of obtaining reliable information in our society will diminish. These panelists point to an increasing variety of media for the transmission of information on which to base rational action. They argue that governmental policy seems to be moving towards the distribution of increasing amounts of information and is developing the appropriate institutions to do so, e.g., Information Canada. A more highly educated population, furthermore, will have the skills necessary to acquire information at lower costs than populations with lower levels of education.

A major proportion of panelists feel that the manipulation of opinion and behavior by the mass media will increase but only very slightly. Again, these panelists argue that an increasing variety of information sources will prevent such manipulation and that governmental policy will move to protect the population from such manipulation. Both these arguments presuppose the primacy of technological innovation over social control.

SUMMARY:
SOCIAL FUTURES FOR ALBERTA

What kind of society is emerging? A "multi-option society"? No, not if the basic divisions in our society continue to widen. An "exuberant democracy?" Hardly, if the forecasts presented here are credible. Are we moving towards a "garrison state"? Perhaps, but we may find new and creative ways to manage broad-scale social conflict, if such management becomes necessary. A forecast of what appears to be a condition of anarchy or chaos by present standards may simply point to a more active version of Canadian society. In any case, the characterization of our social future is partly an evaluative function which the reader may wish to develop for himself.

In conclusion, in addition to a simple forecast of our social future, this exercise will identify the major themes which have emerged: (1) our society is in, and will continue to be in, a period of transition for the foreseeable future; (2) the aspirations of Canadians generally, and Albertans specifically, will far outrun their ability to achieve those aspirations; (3) our most salient institutions – the family, church, education, leisure and politics – will undergo continued change, some units much more rapidly than others; (4) the value of individuality will be upgraded and this upgrading will be expressed in a variety of ways through education, leisure and religion; and (5) aspects of both rapid and slow change will result in higher levels of psychic and social unrest.

RUN-AWAY ASPIRATIONS

The value of quantity is giving way to the value of quality. For example, the values ascribed to health care, knowledge and environment, and,to a lesser extent, personal liberty, civil rights, legal equality, and privacy will all likely be very salient goals for an increasing proportion of the population, especially for the unemployed and the poor, including Native peoples. Increased leisure, other than forced leisure (unemployment), will provide a much greater opportunity to enjoy, consume and participate. Will our society be able to achieve in accordance with these aspirations?

There is always a certain disparity between aspiration and achievement. The gap between the two appears to be directly related to the precedence of discontent and unrest. In order to maintain some social stability while passing through a period of transition, achievement levels must be increased to meet rising expectations and aspirations, or the aspirations must be standardized downwards. There must occasionally be a combination of both value reorientations. The forecasts in this study suggest that any measures taken will not be adequate. The potential for militancy, radicalism and massive social unrest will increase, at least for the next two decades.

A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION

At present, we live in a transitional society moving from an industrial to a post- or ultra-industrial society, from a limited to a multi-option society, and from a relatively peaceful state to a much more turbulent one. Our society is currently changing from one in which the family, the church, the school and government were respected, to one in which these institutions are in many respects considered dysfunctional and perhaps obsolete. Disrespect was, in the past, often coupled with passivity, but, now and in the future, the citizenry will be more easily mobilized on behalf of a variety of goals – goals which will frequently be in conflict. In the past, ours has been a "working" society; within the next 35 years it will become a "leisured" society. We have grown up and lived in a society which values and fosters trust; in the future an "economy of trust" may give way to the quest for physical protection. This transition brings with it many new problems and compounds many problems that are already with us.

INSTITUTIONAL OBSOLESCENCE

Many institutions in our society are experiencing obsolescence in one respect or another. Judging from the scale of change suggested in the forecasts, perhaps the churches and educational institutions will have the most severe problem with obsolescence. The church will likely continue to diminish in importance and relevance; educational institutions will likely attempt some fundamental reforms, perhaps by downgrading authoritarianism, making its emphasis more relevant to current thought and values, and encouraging student participation. These reforms, however, will probably be inadequate; student demands and needs will always outrun the accomplishments of an educational reformation.

The family will continue to adapt to changes in values and in occupational structure. Parental role changes, increased peer influence, and increasing family permissiveness will likely permit greater public control of child-rearing. The fluidity of the family, resulting from changes in values pertaining to the permanence of marriage and parenthood and other changes in the social structure, will undoubtedly keep the family adaptive. Current parental roles, however, may become obsolescent in the future.

Politics in our society will become more active than in the past. Individuals will be more easily mobilized as a result of the increased pressures of social transition. Protest or confrontation politics may become the accepted style when dealing with governments, but governments may not be able to cope with these styles or with the increased aspirations anticipated for quality in social life. Structure of government may be somewhat modified, but will governmental momentum be able to accommodate a society in transition?

INDIVIDUALITY

One of the most persistent themes in this exercise is the importance of individuality in the future. Values ascribed to individuality, to personal freedom, and to self-esteem will likely be appreciably upgraded. This tendency will be reflected in religion, with an emphasis on the self and on individually obtained religious experience; in education, with emphasis on individual freedom in learning; and in leisure, with a forecasted stress upon individual rather than group activities.

The consequences of an increased emphasis on self and individuality for social structure and social processes are many. Suffice it to say here that maximum variation in the way an individual lives his life will become a requirement and a demand in the future. This may mean increasing social mobility, a breakdown of the work-leisure dichotomy, the building of jobs around people rather than people around jobs, a greater symmetry in interpersonal and organizational relations, and the internalization of the values of dissimilarity, inconstancy, and even inconsistency. It does mean the maximization of decentralization, of multiple options, and of behavioral diversity.

PSYCHIC AND SOCIAL UNREST

The strongest theme among these forecasts pertains to the frustration of the individual. Role confusion, identity problems, and normlessness are all forecasted as resulting from a great variety of factors – institutional obsolescence, oppressive tendencies, i.e., the invasion of privacy, rapid social changes, and technological increase, etc. Consequently, mental illness, dependence on drugs and alcohol, suicide, and the potential for social unrest will all increase. Many individual needs will go unmet; basic needs such as the need for food and protection, existential needs, needs for interpersonal warmth, spiritual needs, rationality needs (e.g., needs for reliable information), and needs for emotional and personal development.

In describing the future of our society, it is important to remember that no one forecast or group of forecasts must come true. There is no certainty that any one forecast will come about. To a greater or lesser extent, we can help to choose our future by looking at it head-on, perhaps not so much on the short run, since most of our resources are already committed, but certainly in the long run. It is possible to rebuild the tracks of our history – if we so choose. We can take steps in the present to avoid the crises of the future. More precisely, we can undertake today to "improve" our social condition for tomorrow. But will improvement alone be sufficient?

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

SELECTION OF PANELISTS

The selection of panelists for each of the six Delphi panels was undertaken and completed in early May. The method employed in selecting panel members was a modified version of a "snow-balling" technique, often mentioned in the literature on Delphi studies and survey research.

The process of selection for each panel began with the careful choice of from eight to fifteen "knowledgeable" and "informed" persons to act as resource individuals. It was agreed by the entire study staff that these resource individuals could best point out other experts who in turn could provide a broad and general coverage for each particular aspect of a given topic. Care was taken to select resource people who held widely divergent points of view. Each resource individual was then contacted by phone and asked to provide a list of ten or more persons with whom he was acquainted and whom he considered "knowledgeable" and "informed" in the specific area. These resource individuals were also requested to participate as panelists in the study.

From these complete lists of named experts, the staff, in consultation with the project head, selected between 40 and 60 persons to act as participants for each panel. The 40 to 60 people selected as panelists were chosen to represent as many points of view, organizations and specialties as possible within each given topical area. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the number of persons acting as resource individuals, prospective panel members, and selected panel members.

TABLE 1 – SELECTION OF PANELISTS

Panel Topic	Number of Resource Individuals	Number of Prospective Panelists	Number of Selected Panelists
Social Goals and Values	8	82	46
The Needs of the Individual	11	170	42
Political Life	15	125	37
Family Life and Child Rearing	12	90	50
Leisure and Recreation	14	125	43
Intercultural Relations	13	130	63

Each potential selected panel member was phoned or contacted personally and asked if he or she would care to participate in the study*. A surprisingly small number of potential panelists refused to participate at the time of initial contact. Some potential panelists, reluctant to commit themselves, decided they would affirm their commitment only after looking over FORM A. Reasons for outright refusals (a number never exceeding 5% in any one panel) were usually given as lack of time, or involvement in other commitments.

*An exception to this statement is the panel on Intercultural Relations in which only 34 panelists were personally contacted. The remaining 29 panelists were sent the forms with a letter of request.

PREPARATION OF FORM A

Preparation and organization of FORM A was started simultaneously with the selection of the panelists. All staff members prepared tentative outlines of each topical area. These outlines were then discussed during seminars dealing with each area. A master outline on each panel topic was compiled after each seminar. A single staff member then chose the area which stirred his imagination the most and carried through the task of working and reworking the outline for that area. One staff member, therefore, was responsible for all the work on that panel from this time forward (including telephone and personal contact.) Occasionally, when the panels had sections which overlapped, two or more staff members joined together to work out problems inherent in that particular section. Frequent meetings kept all staff abreast of one another's particular problems and progress.

The culmination of these efforts produced a final outline, with accompanying instructions and forecast sheets. With one panel, The Needs of the Individual, it was felt that an outline would be restrictive and would, perhaps, infringe upon the prerogative of the other five topical areas. For this reason, the outline portion of the panel on The Needs of the Individual was deliberately omitted. It was suggested to the panelists in a cover letter that they might, at their discretion, use or disregard the outlines for their particular topical area.

Accompanying the outline were the following sort of instructions (these,for the Political Life Panel) plus a number of forecast answer sheets:

F3

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Panelists are requested to compose forecasts of major political developments in Canada, and in Alberta specifically, which are likely to occur during the next three or four decades. Please focus on those aspects of the topic in which you have particular interest or knowledge. You may wish to forecast events such as the passing of new laws, states or conditions such as relationships between the local and central governments, or processes and trends such as changes in rates of citizen participation in politics.

2. Any statement about the future implies certain assumptions; consequently, different sets of assumptions may result in quite different forecasts. Whenever possible, respondents should state their reasons for particular forecasts. These may be in abbreviated form and might consist of a statement about underlying assumptions, or alternatively, references to any supporting data or research.

3. In order to clarify the topic and provide some orientation toward the problem, we have prepared an outline (inserted). This outline may serve you as a reminder of certain aspects of the topic. It may also give you some idea of the scope of our interests. The outline is not to be considered definitive, and inclusion of other aspects is welcomed. Furthermore, if certain categories in the outline appear unsuitable or irrelevant, respondents are invited to modify or ignore them at their discretion.

4. Answer sheets have been included, and wherever possible the format shown should be followed. If additional space is required, the back of the page may be used or additional sheets may be inserted.

5. For the purposes of this study we are concerned with a time period covering the next 30 to 40 years. When appropriate, the forecasts should also be limited to Alberta.

6. In the event that difficulties arise, the respondents may contact (staff member's name and telephone number).

7. Forecasts should be completed and returned in the stamped envelope by (date).

The format for the forecast answer sheets was as follows:

Forecast:

Reasons/Assumptions:

The entire sheet, except for these headings, remained blank.

Panelists provided forecasts and reasons of their own choosing on this form based on the outline if they so desired. These results were returned, examined, grouped and edited, and finally rephrased and mailed out again in the text of FORM B.

PREPARATION OF FORM B

The objective of FORM B was threefold: (1) to obtain time and probability persepctives on the forecasts submitted in FORM A; (2) to obtain a rationale for those perspectives; and (3) to solicit further forecasts.

The format of FORM B was developed from a careful analysis of all forecast data in FORM A. The forecasts were collected, sorted categorically, edited and checked for clarity, coverage and comprehensiveness. Two formats were developed, one for forecasts of events or conditions, another for forecasts of trends. The former was used to solicit estimated dates and probabilities, the latter to solicit estimated increases or decreases in trends using three ten-year time periods, and their probabilities.

An example of a FORM B question (taken from the panel on Family Life and Child-Rearing) concerning an event forecast:

Listed below is an event which panelists have forecasted for the Family of the Future. Please indicate your judgment on the probability of this forecast. Note that the numbers to be inserted by you in each row should add up to 100.

	1970-1972	1973-1975	1976-1979	1980-1990	1991-2005	After 2005	Not at any time	COMMENTS
1. Trial marriages will receive legal definition and regulation			10	30	60			

In this example, the respondent believes there is a 10% chance that trial marriages will be given legal status during 1976-1979, a 30% chance that this will occur during 1980-1990, and a 60% chance that it will occur during 1991-2005. Another way of interpreting this illustration is that there is a 40% chance that trial marriages will be given legal status by 1990 and a 100% chance that this will occur by 2005.

An example of a FORM B question concerning a trend forecast, however, might read:

Listed below is a trend forecasted in FORM A. The objective here is to obtain somewhat more specificity on the probability and shape of this trend. Will the trend show an increase or a decrease or will it remain at the present level? How much will it increase or decrease, if at all? What is your best guess on the probability of the shape of the trend? On what basis do you make these judgments?

Distribute 100 points for each of the three time periods, i.e., 100 points for 1970-1980, 100 points for 1980-1990, etc. Use only rounded figures (10, 20, 30, etc.). These points represent your estimates of trend probabilities.

Present your reasons for given estimates only if you feel that they are necessary to explain the trend or to provide a rationale for your position. We would especially appreciate reasons for your forecast when sharp or drastic increases or decreases are indicated.

Forecast Subject:

Participation in
Communal Living

	INCREASE SHARPLY	INCREASE APPRECIABLY	INCREASE SLIGHTLY	REMAIN THE SAME	DECREASE SLIGHTLY	DECREASE APPRECIABLY	DECREASE SHARPLY
1970-1980	60	40					
1980-1990			10	80	10		
1990-2005					20	60	20

REASONS

1. Communal living will continue to be popular among the young and urban middle classes.
2. Tensions of urban living will promote higher levels of participation during the 1970's.
3. Communal living will begin to show signs of failure in the 1980's — in child-rearing, inability to overcome individualist behaviour patterns.

In this example, the respondent indicates a 60% chance that participation in communal living will increase sharply during 1970-1980, and a 40% chance that it will increase appreciably. During 1980-1990, this participation will continue at the level reached by the end of the last decade with an 80% probability. There will be a 60% chance that participation will decrease appreciably during the period 1990-2005.

Upon the return of FORM B the results were again examined, grouped, and edited in preparation for the final analysis.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Two data sources yielded three distinct varieties of in-put data. The concrete forecasts provided by the panel participants represent one form of data, while the other form emanates from the elaboration of (or "reasons for") specific forecasts. Quite often, the reason data was not straightforward. Some reasons given included forecasts in their own right. In such cases the reasons themselves were used in conjunction with the contained forecasts.

Forecast in-put data, was divided into two categories. Some forecasts described future events, i.e., data which has or could have particular dates attached to the forecast, while other forecasts described future trends, i.e., data which deals with large-scale changes over the entire study period.

Specific dates were requested for event data during the second round of the Delphi study. With this kind of in-put some specified date could then be calculated for the occurence of any given event mentioned in the previous study round.

Agreement with respect to time was arrived at by determining 50% and 90% years. The 50% year is that year in which better than 50% of the panel felt, with some degree of certainty, that any given event would occur. The 90% year is that year in which 90% of the panel were relatively certain about an event's occurence.

Verbal expressions were then assigned to these values so that the 50% year was expressed either as "probably" or "likely," while the 90% year was expressed as "most likely" or "highly probable".

Trend data in-put was measured in a different fashion. Initially, numerical ratings were placed on a seven-point increase-decrease scale. These ratings were expressed in percentages and evenly distributed along the scale to total 100%. The mid-point of the rating scale (the 50% mark) was then determined, indicating a precise point on the scale. Each point on the scale was divided into ten equal units, making a total of 70 units overall. Thirty-five units were considered positive (increase) units while 35 units were considered negative (decrease) units. The rating mid-point could then be calculated to the nearest unit.

A time dimension was added by considering three points representing various dates (1980, 1990, 2005) within the study period. Trending curves therefore could then be developed by plotting the rating mid-point against each time period.

Initially, individual panelist returns were plotted for each forecast. These were then grouped by forecast and compared for similarities in their patterns. Similar patterns often occured. These patterns were then clustered, and general trend profiles emerged. It is these trend profiles that are represented graphically on the pages opposite the text of the study. Event forecasts and reason forecasts appear directly within the text.

Prior to the development of the profile analysis, reasons and forecasts were combined in scenario style. This helped lead toward combining certain forecasts and assisted greatly in grouping forecasts for their final presentation in the text. The scenario exercise often pointed out apparent inconsistencies in the data and allowed for re-evaluation and regrouping. It also provided some clarification of the results gleaned from the profile analysis.

PANEL RESPONSE RATES

The panel response rates for FORMS A and B compared very favorably with most other Delphi studies where response rates are known. The average response rate across panels was better than a 50% return in this particular study. In some panels, the response rate exceeded a 60% return. A considerable difference in the number of returns per panel can be noted, with a low percentage of return figures appearing especially in the areas of Political Life and Intercultural Relations. Low returns in the area of Intercultural Relations were anticipated prior to the study, since approximately half of the initial send-outs were mailed requests. Consent to participate in the study was not given by panelists receiving these requests. The low percentage return rate in the Political Life panel cannot be as easily explained; however, the percentage return rate here was approximately 42% – a figure which is not much lower than the 50% return rate average. Two panels, those of Social Goals and Values and Family Life and Child-Rearing, both exceeded 60% in panel return rates. In all, these return rates can be considered quite satisfactory, especially if one takes into account that this study was instituted over a period when summer vacation interference was at a maximum. The number of panel terminations during the study period did not exceed 15% of the total number of Delphi panelists on any one panel. Some panel returns not recorded on the chart below were used, in part, in this study. These could not be included as part of the official accounting, simply because they were received after the deadline date and could not be considered in terms of the total analysis of the panel data. Following is a chart describing the panel response rates in FORMS A and B of the Alberta Delphi Interaction Study.

PANEL RESPONSE RATES
for FORM A and FORM B

Panel Topic	Number of Panelists	Panel Terminations	Number of Returns for FORM A	Number of Returns for FORM B
Social Goals and Values	37	3	25	21
The Needs of the Individual	42	5	26	18
Political Life	43	3	19	17
Family Life and Child Rearing	46	4	32	29
Leisure and Recreation	45	5	27	22
Intercultural Relations contacted	33	4	15	15
mailed requests	29	5	5	4
TOTAL	305	29	149	126